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3 I.INTRODUCTION 
I.INTRODUCTION 
 
INT-1.In the latest decades, financial markets experienced the dematerialization of securities and the 
globalization of financial services. Nowadays, financial investments take place in an international level 
with cross-border securities book entries. In other words, securities holdings take place across multiple 
jurisdictions.
1
  
INT-2.However, the legal consequences of the securities holdings vary in every jurisdiction involved, 
creating legal uncertainty to the participants in securities transactions,
2
 due to the possible absence of 
specialized provisions -on transactions with securities- in some national legal orders or due to the 
incompatibility between the national rules of each State.
3
 This situation may lead to significant losses in 
the relevant market participants. In other words, they bear legal risk.
4
 
INT-3.The avoidance of legal risk is of particular importance to the creditors who acquire cross-border 
held securities or interests in them, as collateral security, in lieu of financial collateral agreements.
5
 The 
collateral takers are particularly sensitive to legal risk, since there are sometimes different national legal 
doctrines as to the nature of collateral (security/pledge), its transfer and the rights deriving from it, 
which are incompatible one to another. 
INT-4.To combat the legal risk and to facilitate the conduct of international financial investments, the 
European Commission and UNIDROIT undertook the initiative to draft the ‘Financial Collateral 
Directive’ and the ‘Geneva Securities Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities’, 
respectively. Both pay substantial attention to financial collateral agreements, as it is obvious from the 
fact that the latter constitute the sole object of the whole ‘Financial Collateral Directive’6 and of Chapter 
V of the ‘Geneva Securities Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities’7. 
INT-5.With their provisions, the ‘Financial Collateral Directive’ and Chapter V of the ‘Geneva 
Securities Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities’, both intend to achieve 
compatibility of legal systems,
8
 in order to limit the legal and systemic risk arising from cross-border 
financial collateral transactions.
9
 They establish common legal frameworks on the ‘law of collateral’,10 
which may also constitute new law for the Member or Contracting States not having yet adopted such 
legislation
11
. 
                                                          
1
 For the INTRODUCTION See Luc Thevenoz, ‘Intermediated Securities, Legal Risk and the International Harmonization of 
Commercial Law’, Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance, Spring 2008, at p.p. 388-399 [hereinafter Thevenoz] and 
Louise Gullifer, ‘Ownership of Securities-The Problems Caused by Intermediation’, in Louise Gullifer and Jennifer Payne 
‘Intermediated Securities-Legal Problems and Practical Issues’, at p.p.4-9 [hereinafter Gullifer-Ownership]. 
2
 Gullifer-Ownership, at p.p.4-5. 
3
 Gullifer-Ownership, at p.p.4-5. 
4
 Thevenoz, at p.p.392. 
5
 Thevenoz, at p.p.392. 
6
 Directive 2002/47/EC on Financial Collateral Arrangements, OJ L 168, 27.6.2002, p.p. 43 [hereinafter FCD]. 
7
 UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities, CONF. 11/2, Doc. 42 [hereinafter GSC].  
8
 Recital (4) of the GSC Preamble, Hideki Kanda, Charles Mooney, Luc Thevenoz, Stefane Beraud, assisted by Thomas 
Keijser, ‘Official Commentary on the Unidroit Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities’, Oxford 
University Press, 2012, par. Int-17 [hereinafter GSC Official Commentary]. 
9
 Recital (3) of the GSC Preamble, GSC Official Commentary, par. Int-16 and Int-21. 
10
 Recitals (1), (3) and (22) of the FCD Preamble and Recital (5) of the GSC Preamble . 
11
Manfred Obermueller and Holger Hartenfels, ‘Finanzsicherheiten’, BKR 2004, p.p. 440 [hereinafter Obermueller- 
Hartenfells] and Georgos Pergamalis, ‘Directive 2002/47/EC for Financial Collateral Arrangements’, Corporate and 
Business Journal, 10
th
 Year, 1/2004, p.p. 34 (in Greek) [hereinafter Pergamalis]. 
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GENEVA SECURITIES CONVENTION 
II. COMPATIBILITY OF THE EU FINANCIAL COLLATERAL 
DIRECTIVE AND CHAPTER V OF THE GENEVA SECURITIES 
CONVENTION 
 
In this Dissertation Thesis, the Financial Collateral Directive (hereinafter Collateral Directive), will be 
compared with the provisions of the fifth (V) Chapter of the Geneva Securities Convention (hereinafter 
Geneva Convention) on Financial Collateral Transactions, aiming at detecting if those legal instruments 
are compatible. 
Before proceeding with the substantive topics, it is considered appropriate for a systematic review, to 
present, first, the legal nature and the basic principles, which are instilled into the entire body of the 
Collateral Directive and Geneva Convention. 
The comparison of the aforementioned instruments, as regards the legal issues, will follow the following 
structure: the Collateral Directive is the anchor of the analysis and the Geneva Convention is analyzed 
and contradicted in parallel. This structure is used not only to avoid repetitions, but also to emphasize on 
the topics, where the similarities and differences of these legal instruments are found. 
  
   
INTERNATIONAL HELLENIC UNIVERSITY 
 
  
5 
II. COMPATIBILITY OF THE EU FINANCIAL COLLATERAL DIRECTIVE AND CHAPTER V OF THE 
GENEVA SECURITIES CONVENTION 
A. LEGAL NATURE AND BASIC PRINCIPLES 
 
A.1.Both the Collateral Directive and the Geneva Convention are legal instruments regulating a supra-
national legal order.  
In particular, the Collateral Directive belongs to the aquis-communautaire of the European Union (EU), 
a sui generis supra-national legal system with its own competences.
12
 The latter are conferred to the 
EU
13
 by the Member States
14
 and should be exercised according to the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality,
15
 reflected
16
 in the text of the Collateral Directive. As regards its legal nature, the 
Collateral Directive is a legal act of a European Institution, ‘binding, as to the result to be achieved, 
upon each Member State’ (Article 249 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union). 
Therefore, the Member States are obliged to incorporate and adapt the Collateral Directive to the 
domestic legal regime. 
A.2.On the other hand, the Geneva Convention was drafted as a binding international law instrument by 
the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT)
17
 to be adopted as a 
Convention by the representatives of UNIDROIT Member States.
18
 In contrast to the Collateral 
Directive, the Geneva Convention was designed and adopted, so as to apply, only if the States sign the 
Geneva Convention and fulfill other constitutional requirements of their domestic law, such as 
ratification, accession et.c.
19
 Thus, the application of the Geneva Convention is optional for the 
Contracting States. 
A.3.It should be highlighted that not only the whole Geneva Convention is optional, but also its Chapter 
V, which includes rules on the financial collateral arrangements. Chapter V was given optional 
character, so that the Geneva Convention could address more Contracting States, by responding to their 
public policy issues, especially of consumer protection and insolvency.
20
   
A.4.As to the principles, the drafters of the Geneva Convention adopted: the minimalist approach, the 
functional approach and the compatibility with other relevant instruments. The minimalist approach 
works in an equivalent way with the principles proportionality and subsidiarity of the Collateral 
Directive, in the sense that the Geneva Convention regulates only those issues necessary to achieve the 
purpose of the Convention.
21
 The functional (and neutral) approach
22
 of the Geneva Convention 
                                                          
12
 C- 6-64, Costa V. Enel, [1964] and Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, ‘The ABC of European Union Law’, Publications Office of 
the European Union, 2010, p.p. 31 [hereinafter Borchardt]. 
13
It was drafted by the European Commission and adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union according to the procedure of Article 251 TEC, now Article 294 TFEU.  
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Article 5(b) and (c) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), now Article 5 (3) and (4) of the Treaty of 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Borchardt, p.p. 41. 
16
 It covers only those issues, which the States cannot regulate on their own, due to reasons of scale and effects of the action 
(principle of subsidiarity), and only to the minimum extent possible (principle of proportionality- Recital (22) of the FCD).   
17
 GSC Official Commentary, p.p. v, vi. 
18
 GSC Official Commentary, par.Int-31. 
19
 UNIDROIT website, under the title ‘About UNIDROIT’, ‘Overview’, ‘Legislative Policy’, in internet: 
<http://www.unidroit.org/dynasite.cfm?dsmid=103284>.  
20
 GSC Official Commentary, par.38-7. Apart from these concerns, it has been argued that the provisions of Chapter V are 
“too collateral-taker-friendly, and thus could be detrimental to the interests of the collateral provider and her creditors”, see 
Changmin Chun, ‘Cross-Border Transactions of Intermediated Securities- A Comparative Analysis in Substantive Law and 
Private International Law’, Springer, 2012, p.p.101[hereinafter Chun].  
21
 Ibid and UNIDROIT 2011, S78B/CEM/2/Doc.2, ‘References to Sources of Law Outside the Convention (prepared by the 
Secretariat)’, November 2011, Section 2, p.p. 2 [hereinafter UNIDROIT References]. 
22
 Recital (6) of the GSC Preamble. 
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GENEVA SECURITIES CONVENTION 
represents the use of legal terms which introduce rules, whose content is formulated by reference to their 
results, so that these legal terms are as neutral
23
 as possible.
24
 The Collateral Directive does not refer to 
any such principle, as the functional approach, since the full range European Law is interpreted 
autonomously by the European Court of Justice.
25
  
A.5.As to the holding systems which are addressed by the Collateral Directive and the Geneva 
Convention, it appears that the Collateral Directive addresses mostly non-intermediated systems
26
, 
whereas the Geneva Convention is drafted on the structure of intermediated systems
27
. The Collateral 
Directive applies to securities as collaterals, which can be directly and indirectly held by the investors.
28
 
There is no relevant provision as to the types of holding systems, to which it applies, and the Preamble is 
also not very helpful to this direction. However, the conclusion that the Collateral Directive covers all 
possible holding systems arises out of the absence of terms referring to intermediation in the text of the 
Collateral Directive and out of the fact that there is great variety of holding system types among the 
Member States. Indicatively, there are transparent systems
29
, trusts systems
30
, systems of full undivided 
property interests
31
, systems of pooled holding
32
. What is more, in Europe, intermediaries mostly 
function as brokers of the investors and not as persons legally responsible with their own, independent 
role as to the fulfilment of legal obligations against the investors.
33
   
A.6.On the other hand, the Geneva Convention presupposes that every Contracting State has some kind 
of intermediated holding system.
34
 Moreover, all of its rules are adapted to an ‘intermediated system’ 
(‘intermediated securities’, ‘credit-debit’, ‘control agreement’,‘insolvency of an intermediary’). In other 
words, the Geneva Convention does not apply when the securities are directly held by the investor or 
they are registered with their issuer in the name of the investor.
35
 For the systems, where the 
intermediaries are not legally responsible for the holding of securities against the investors, the 
Convention addresses other persons as conducting the functions of intermediaries.
36
 These other holding 
patterns, such as the ‘transparent systems’, are addressed only when the securities account agreement is 
concluded as a brokerage contract and not as the necessary legal act in order to invest in securities.
37
   
A.7.As to the determination of the subject, the Collateral Directive regulates only financial collateral 
arrangements, while the Geneva Convention covers all the issues arising during the function of an 
                                                          
23
 In particular, the functional approach does not attempt to equate either the relevant national doctrines, eliminating the 
underlying legal traditions of each State, or the results arising from the application of these doctrines  - in particular in the 
field of proprietary and insolvency law-.   
24
GSC Official Commentary, par. Int-20, at p.p. 5 and Charles W. Mooney, Jr and Hideki Kanda, ‘Core Issues under the 
UNIDROIT (Geneva) Convention on Intermediated Securities: Views from United States and Japan’, in ‘Intermediated 
Securities- Legal Problems and Practical Issues’, Louise Gullifer and Jennifer Payne, Hart Publishing, 2010, at p.p. 74-75 
[hereinafter Mooney- Kanda]. 
25
 Borchardt, at p.p. 115. 
26
 ‘Non-intermediated’, with the meaning of not institutionally and functionally necessary intermediaries.  
27
 Chun, p.p 33 and UNIDROIT Study LXXVIII. DOC.19, at 1.2.1 [hereinafter DOC 19].  
28
 Roy Goode, Herbert Kronke and Ewan McKendrick, ‘Transnational Commercial Law- Text, Cases and Materials’, Oxford 
University Press, 2007, at par.13.32, at p.p.494 [hereinafter Goode-Kronke]. 
29
 Nordic Countries, Greece, Spain. 
30
 England and Wales. 
31
 France. 
32
 Germany and Austria. 
33
 Similarly, in GSC Official Commentary, par.1-43. 
34
 GSC Official Commentary, par.29-14. 
35
 GSC Official Commentary, par. 1-19. 
36
 GSC Official Commentary, par.7-1. 
37
 See relevantly GSC Official Commentary, par.1-43 and 1-45 and Philipp Paech, ‘Market Needs as Paradigm: Breaking up 
the Thinking on EU Securities Law’, LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 11/2012, at p.p. 10 [hereinafter 
Paech].  
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intermediated system, from the creation of the rights in intermediated securities, their acquisition and the 
conclusion of collateral arrangements in intermediated securities to the insolvency of the intermediary. 
Thus, the Geneva Convention has a wider object than the Collateral Directive. 
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B. PERSONAL SCOPE 
 
i) The Financial Collateral Directive 
B.1.The Collateral Directive applies to bilateral financial collateral arrangements,
38
 and the categories to 
which the two parties in the arrangement may belong are determined in Article 1(2). The latter provides 
that there are two options for the Member States, to determine the entities to which the Collateral 
Directive applies:  
1. According to the first, both parties should belong to the following categories: (a) public 
authorities, including the public sector bodies participating in the administration of public debt or 
authorized to hold accounts for customers, (b) National Central Banks (NCB), the European 
Central Bank (ECB), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Multilateral Development 
Banks
39
 (MDB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Investment Bank 
(EIB), (c) financial institutions subject to prudential supervision, including credit institutions
40
, 
investment firms
41
, financial institutions
42
, insurance undertakings
43
, undertakings for collective 
investment in transferrable securities (UCITS) and management companies, as well as (d) 
Central Counterparties (CCP), Settlement Agents or Clearing Houses, including similar 
institutions acting in futures, options and derivatives markets, and non-natural persons acting in a 
trust or representative capacity for other persons, including bondholders or holders of other 
forms of securitized debt or any aforementioned (from (a) to (d)) institution. 
2. According to the second option, if one of the parties to the financial collateral arrangement is an 
institution or a person belonging to the aforementioned categories (under option 1), then the 
other party to the arrangement can be any other non-natural person, including unincorporated 
firms and partnerships.
44
 In other words, this option excludes individual entepreneurs, but 
includes foundations and all kinds of associations
45
, even without legal personality.
46
 
B.2.It is clear from both options that the Collateral Directive does not apply to financial collateral 
arrangements in two cases: first, when a party is a natural person,
47
 and second, where both parties 
belong to the category of Article 1(2)(e), such as partnerships, associations, unincorporated firms and 
                                                          
38
 Recital (3) of the FCD Preamble. 
39
 As this sub-paragraph was amended by Article 2(4) of the Directive 2009/44/EC, OJ L 146, 10.6.2009, p.p.37 [hereinafter 
Amending Directive] which (article) refers to Directive 2006/48/EC, Annex VI, Part I, Section 4 for the Multilateral 
Investment Banks. 
40
This subparagraph was amended by the Amending Directive, Article 2(4), which refers to Directive 2006/48/EC Article 
4(1) and Article 2 for the relevant institutions. 
41
 This subparagraph was amended by the Amending Directive, Article 2(4), which refers to Directive 2004/39/EC Article 
4(1)(1) for the relevant institutions. 
42
This subparagraph was amended by the Amending Directive, Article 2(4), which refers to Directive 2006/48/EC Article 
4(5) for the relevant institutions.  
43
This subparagraph was amended by the Amending Directive, Article 2(4), which refers to Directive 2002/43/EC Article 
1(1)(a) and Article 2 for the relevant institutions.  
44
 Article 1(2)(e) FCD. 
45
 Pergamalis, at p.p. 37. 
46
 Franco Bonfanti, ‘The Pledge under the Civil Code and Special Legislation: The Impact of the New Legislation for 
Contracts of Financial Collateral’ (in Italian), PhD Thesis, Ferrara University of Studies, at p.p. 76-81 [hereinafter Bonfanti].    
47
 Bonfanti, p.p.78 and Thomas Rudolf Maria Pius Keijser, ‘A Need for a Change- The Undesirable Consequences of the 
Settlement Finality Directive and the Collateral Directive in the Field of Property and Insolvency Law, in Particular for 
Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises’, Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht, 2006, p.p. 308-325, at p.p.310 [hereinafter 
T.R.M.P.Keijser ZEuP]. 
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foundations.
48
 The requirement that one of the parties to the collateral agreement should be an entity 
included in Article 1(2)(a),(b),(c),(d), is due to the intention of the European Commission to impose the 
application of the Collateral Directive in regulated transactions.
49
 This is the case under the Collateral 
Directive, because the entities of Article 1(2)(a),(b),(c),(d) are considered as regulated.
50
 
B.3.The participation of micro, small and medium enterprises in a financial collateral arrangement, 
having as counterparty a major market participant, is covered by both of the aforementioned options. In 
the first option, the category of ‘non-natural persons acting in a trust or representative capacity for other 
persons’ can include also minor market participants along with the major ones. However, it is the second 
option that addresses, in practice, mostly micro, small and medium enterprises, widening the scope of 
application of the Collateral Directive.
51
 This wide personal scope of application was introduced to 
facilitate the access of no or low credit rating businesses to easy and low-cost credit,
52
 and was 
supported by representatives of the banking and financial derivatives industry,
53
 in their pursuit of 
achieving a wider customer range.  
B.4.However, due to accusations of overriding fundamental national insolvency principles for the 
equality of creditors
54
 (paritas creditorum),
55
 as well as to concerns of lack of fair balance or bargaining 
power (Verhandlungsmacht) between the parties to the financial collateral arrangements,
56
 the European 
legislator kept a neutral position and left the choice between the efficiency of financial markets and the 
‘rule of law’ to the national authorities to decide if they would implement the wider personal scope or 
not.
57
 
B.5.In particular, the Collateral Directive provides the Member States with the opt-out possibility to 
exclude the aforementioned second option. The opt-out clause limits the personal scope of application, 
by allowing Member States to ‘exclude from the scope of this Directive financial collateral 
arrangements where one of the parties is a person mentioned in paragraph 2(e)’-i.e. non-natural person, 
including unincorporated firms and partnerships- (Article 1(3)).  
ii) Chapter V of Geneva Securities Convention 
                                                          
48
 Thomas Rudolf Maria Pius Keijser, ‘Financial Collateral Arrangements- The European Collateral Directive Considered 
from a Property and Insolvency Law Perspective’, Kluwer, 2006, p.p. 69 [ hereinafter T.R.M.P.Keijser]. 
49
 A contrario, from COM(2006) 833 final, Commission of the European Communities, ‘Report from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council- Evaluation Report on the Financial Collateral Arrangements Directive’, at par.4.2.1, at 
p.p.9 [hereinafter COM(2006)]. 
50
 It goes without saying that public authorities, systemic banks and central counterparties are regulated and for the rest 
entities it is stated: “financial institution subject to prudential supervision” (Article (1)(2)(c)). 
51
 T.R.M.P.Keijser, p.p.51. 
52
 Pergamalis, p.p. 37, and MEMO/01/108, ‘Proposed Directive on Financial Collateral Arrangements- Frequently Asked 
Questions’, 30 March 2001, p.p. 3, in internet: < http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-01-108_en.htm>. 
53
 T.R.M.P.Keijser, p.p. 51-52. 
54
In particular, that the new regime would result in the creation of special privileges for banking and financial institutions 
detrimental to the other creditors of SMEs, providing the former with unlimited access to companies’ assets in insolvency 
situations, See T.R.M.P.Keijser, p.p. 52 and Klaus M. Loeber, ‘The German Implementation of the EC Directive on Financial 
Collateral Arrangements’, Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 2005, p.p. 73 [hereinafter Loeber- German 
Implementation]. 
55
 T.R.M.P.Keijser, p.p. 52, Loeber-German Implementation, p.p.73, Klaus M. Loeber, ‘Der Entwurf einer Richtlinie fuer 
Finanzsicherheiten’, BKR 2001, p.p. 120 [hereinafter Loeber-Entwurf], Klaus M. Loeber and Ewa Klima, ‘The 
Implementation of Directive 2002/47 on Financial Collateral Arrangements’, Journal of International Banking Law and 
Regulation, 2006, p.p. 207 [hereinafter Loeber-Klima].  
56
 Risk, which was not eliminated in total with the introduction of the provision of article 1(4)(c), with the Amending 
Directive Article 2(4)(and will be explained later), because the introduced exclusion covers only the consumers and leaves 
the commercial enterprises with low bargaining power inside the scope of the Directive 2002/47/EC. 
57
 Klaus Loeber and Ewa Klima, p.p.207. 
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B.6.Chapter V of the Geneva Convention applies only to the parties of a collateral agreement, the 
collateral provider and the collateral taker,
58
 in other words it applies to bilateral collateral agreements.
59
  
B.7.While it determines the terms ‘collateral provider’ and ‘collateral taker’, as the person granting an 
interest under a collateral agreement and the person being granted an interest in intermediated 
securities,
60
 respectively, the Geneva Convention has no particular article referring in the positive way to 
the identity of collateral providers and takers, namely it does not include any enumeration or 
categorization of the eligible persons. Thus, it appears that the Geneva Convention applies not only to all 
professional entities and legal persons, such as banks, pension funds, insurance undertakings, as well as 
small and medium enterprises and collective entities without legal personality, but also to natural 
persons.
61
 The same conclusion could be deducted also for the character of the eligible entities as 
regulated or non-regulated, as form the absence of any provision regarding this division, it seems that 
the Geneva Convention applies both to regulated and non-regulated entities. This wide circle of 
qualified persons can be explained by the pursuit of unlimited circulation of collateral and immediate 
satisfaction of creditors, without traditional procedural safeguards, with final purpose to achieve more 
liquidity in the market.
62
 
B.8.However, the wider the personal scope, the more possible it is that unbalanced and unconscionable 
collateral arrangements may be concluded. Therefore, in order to avoid the imbalance of bargaining 
power between the parties to the collateral transaction, the drafters of the Geneva Convention added an 
opt-out clause under Article 38(2)(a), to provide the possibility of restricting the personal scope of 
Chapter V, for reasons of consumer protection and insolvency law
63
.
64
 By this opt-out provision, the 
Contracting States are given the opportunity to declare that the Geneva Convention will not apply inside 
their territory, having two options of declaration: 
a) According to the first, they may exclude natural persons from the personal scope of the 
Convention, or 
b) According to the second, they may specify in their declaration the categories of persons, which 
they would like not to be subject to the effects of the provisions of Chapter V. 
 
COMPARISON OF THE COLLATERAL DIRECTIVE AND GENEVA CONVENTION 
B.9.From a systemic point of view, while the Collateral Directive determines its personal scope in a 
positive way, by enumerating the market participants to be affected by it, the Geneva Convention 
follows the opposite route, including no provision to clarify its target group in the positive way. Instead, 
it draws the boundaries of its personal scope in a negative way, by providing opt-outs. Both instruments, 
though, end up without having definite frame of their personal scope, since the Member States are 
responsible for implementing, or not, the opt-out clauses and which of them. 
                                                          
58
 Article 31(1) GSC. 
59
 Chun, p.p. 100. 
60
 Article 31(3)(f) and (g) GSC. 
61
 GSC Official Commentary, par. 31-27. 
62
 GSC Official Commentary, par. 38-9. 
63
 Chun, p.p. 100. 
64
 GSC Official Commentary, par. 38-9. 
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B.10.As to the teleological interpretation of the two instruments, both have the same ratio behind the 
opt-out clauses, namely the avoidance of inequality between parties to collateral arrangements and 
insolvency considerations.  
B.11.However, the content of the opt-out clause is different in each case. The Collateral Directive 
excludes a priori all natural persons
65
 and does not allow the Member States exclude or include them. 
On the other hand, the Geneva Convention does not consider as self-evident the non-participation of 
natural persons in financial collateral arrangements and, thus, it leaves the exclusion of natural persons 
to the discretion of the Contracting States (Article 38(2)(a)). As a consequence, if a Member State of the 
European Union was to sign and incorporate the Geneva Convention, it would be obliged to make the 
declaration of the first option of Article 38(2)(a) of the Geneva Convention to avoid incompatibility. 
B.12.As to the exclusion of legal persons, the Collateral Directive provides the Member States with the 
possibility to not incorporate the option, where one party to a collateral arrangement is any non-natural 
person, except a public authority, bank, financial institution, central counterparty, settlement agent or 
proxy of bondholders to the aforementioned institutions (entities referred under Article 
1(2)(a),(b),(c),(d)). In other words, if the Member State adopts Article 1(3), it is obliged to restrict the 
personal scope of the Collateral Directive to the entities of Article 1(2)(a) to (d), public, authorities, 
banks, financial institutions, CCPs et.c, excluding all other legal persons, associations, foundations, 
unincorporated firms et.c, namely it has no power to alter the content of the opt-out clause. On the 
contrary, the Geneva Convention allows more freedom to its Contracting Parties as to the second option 
of Article 38(2)(a). In particular, the State is responsible to declare which categories of persons it would 
prefer to disqualify, without any direction being given by the Geneva Convention. Despite the different 
content of the opt-out clauses, both require from the Member States to adopt the opt-out clauses in their 
whole and not modify them or apply them partially. 
B.13.Finally, a further divergence between the two legal instruments is that the Collateral Directive 
applies only to regulated entities, as it can be drawn from the categories of entities it has selected to 
include and the respective interpretation, while the Geneva Convention appears to cover also 
unregulated persons, since the absence of any prerequisite for the identity of the collateral providers and 
collateral takers cannot leave space for the opposite interpretation. 
 
  
                                                          
65
 Article 1(2)(d) and (e) FCD, “..a person other than a natural person…”. 
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C. MATERIAL SCOPE- TYPES OF COLLATERAL 
 
i) The Financial Collateral Directive 
C.1.Article 1(4) of the Collateral Directive determines the assets which can constitute financial 
collateral. In particular, the financial collateral can consist of financial instruments, cash and credit 
claims (Article 1(4)(a)). As financial instruments are considered shares in companies, securities 
equivalent to shares, bonds, other debt instruments
66
, if all these are negotiable on the capital market, 
and any other securities dealt in the market, which are used to acquire shares, bonds, other securities or 
to give rise to cash settlement, excluding instruments of payment, but including units in collective 
investment undertakings, money market instruments and claims for the aforementioned (Article 2(1)(e)). 
Cash refers to money credited to accounts, or claims for the repayment of money (Article 2(1)(d)), while 
credit claims means the pecuniary claims of a credit institution in lieu of a credit given by it in the form 
of loan (Article 2(1)(o)).  
C.2.The material scope, though, can also be restricted. To this end, the Collateral Directive contains two 
opt-out provisions: 
a) Article 1(4)(b) enables the exclusion of collateral provider’s own shares, shares in affiliated 
undertakings and in undertakings with exclusive purpose the ownership of essential to the 
collateral provider’s business means of production or the ownership of real property. In other 
words, it is possible to exclude the securities issued by the collateral provider himself, or by 
enterprises whose existence depends on the economic well-being of the collateral provider. The 
purpose of this opt-out clause is to avoid the use of collaterals, the value of which is closely 
linked to the financial situation of the collateral provider, because if the collateral provider runs 
financial difficulties, the collaterals issued by him may not qualify for recovery, since their value 
will decrease substantially, due to the financial turbulances in the collateral provider’s 
enterprise.
67
  
b) The second opt-out clause introduces the exclusion of credit claims from the list of eligible 
collaterals, on the basis of consumer protection concerns. In particular, the exclusion of credit 
claims is possible, when the debtor is a consumer or a micro or small enterprise (Article 1(4)(c)), 
where ‘consumer’ represents a natural person who is acting for purposes which are outside his 
trade, business or profession,
68
 a ‘small enterprise’ an enterprise which employs fewer than 50 
persons and whose annual turnover total does not exceed EUR 10 million,
69
 and a 
‘microenterprise’ an enterprise which employs fewer than 10 persons and whose annual turnover 
does not exceed EUR 2 million
70
. 
                                                          
66
 Floating charges are also considered as eligible collateral under the Directive, See Antony Zacaroli, ‘Taking Security over 
Intermediated Securities: Chapter V of the UNIDROIT (Geneva) Convention on Intermediated Securities’, in Louise Gullifer 
and Jennifer Payne: ‘Intermediated Securities: Legal Problems and Practical Issues’, Hart Publishing, 2010, at p.p. 170 
[hereinafter Zacaroli]. 
67
 T.R.M.P.Keijser, p.p.66-67. 
68
 Article 3(a) of the Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements of consumers, OJ L 133, 22.5.2008, p.p.66 [hereinafter D 
2008/48/EC]. 
69
 Annex Art.1 and 2(2)(3) of the European Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC, OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p.p.36 
[hereinafter Rec. 2003/361/EC].  
70
 Ibid. 
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C.3.There is also an exception to the ‘consumer’ opt-out in Article 1(4)(c) in fine. This states that the 
identity of consumer or micro-small enterprise is not important, whenever one of the parties to the 
collateral arrangement, the collateral provider or collateral taker, is an institution of Article 1(2)(b) of 
the Collateral Directive, namely a central bank, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS), multilateral development banks, the European Investment Bank or the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Therefore, exclusion of credit claims deriving from consumers or 
small enterprises is not possible, when the collateral arrangement involves a systemic major market 
participant –the avoidance of systemic risk supersedes the protection of consumers-.   
C.4.It should be highlighted, in order to avoid confusion, that under this opt-out provision, the consumer 
or the micro-small enterprises have the role of debtors in a loan agreement with credit institutions and 
not the role of collateral provider or collateral taker. The pecuniary claims arising from this loan 
agreement, are used as financial collateral in another agreement, the financial collateral agreement, 
which is the object of the Collateral Directive. Therefore, the identity of consumer or micro-small 
enterprise, does not refer to the personal scope of the Collateral Directive, but to the origin of the 
financial collateral, namely the material scope of the Collateral Directive. The relationship of this 
provision with the personal scope of the Collateral Directive is restricted to the impact, which is caused 
by the identity of an entity of Article (1)(2)(b), on the width of the material scope. 
C.5.Another limitation to the material scope of the Collateral Directive is that the latter does not apply to 
collaterals, which have not yet been provided (Article 1(5) first sentence), namely when the collateral 
has not entered the sphere of financial domination of the collateral taker.
71
 As provision the Collateral 
Directive considers the delivery, transfer, holding, register or other designation, which result in the 
possession or control of the collateral taker on the collateral (Article 2(2)), where ‘control’ can be 
interpreted as representing the “practical equivalent of possession in the context of physical securities”.72 
In other words, collaterals still under the influence of the collateral provider are not eligible.
73
 The 
requirement of dispossession aims at ensuring that the provisions of the arrangement respond to its real 
performance and no risk of fraud exists, so that the market efficiency is balanced with the safety of the 
parties to the arrangement and third parties.
74
  
  
ii) Chapter V of Geneva Securities Convention 
C.6.According to Article 31(1) of the Geneva Convention, Chapter V applies to collateral agreements, 
under which interests in intermediated securities are granted as collateral (collateral securities). The 
nature of the collateral under the Geneva Convention derives from the definitions of the relevant 
notions, which appear throughout the whole body of the Geneva Convention. In particular, ‘collateral 
securities’ are defined in Article 31(3)(e) as ‘intermediated securities delivered under a collateral 
agreement’, while under Article 1(b) ‘intermediated securities’ are presented as securities credited to a 
                                                          
71
 For detailed analysis of the term ‘provision’ under the FCD and UK law, as well as of the eligibility of floating charges 
under the FCD, see Zacaroli, at p.p.168-170 and 180-182.  
72
 Zacaroli, at p.p.182. 
73
 T.R.M.P.Keijser, p.p.68, and Zacaroli also refers to the argument of the Law Commission, according to which “in order to 
satisfy the requirement of ‘control’ at least the collateral provider must be prevented (whether legally or practically) from 
dealing with the collateral”, Zacaroli, at p.p.182. 
74
 Recital (10) of Directive 2002/47/EC. 
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securities account or rights or interests on securities, held directly or indirectly by the investor,
75
 
resulting from a credit to the relevant account. The provision determining the essence of ‘securities’ is 
placed under Article 1(a) of the Geneva Convention. The latter limits the material scope of the Geneva 
Convention to ‘shares, bonds or other financial instruments or financial assets (other than cash) which 
are capable of being credited to a securities account and of being acquired and disposed of in accordance 
with the provisions of this Convention’.  
C.7.As it becomes clear from the combination of the aforementioned definitions, the material scope of 
the Geneva Convention includes securities, in the form of assets, which fulfill two conditions:  
-first, are able to be held in securities accounts maintained by intermediaries, in other words indirectly 
held by the rightholders, and  
-second, are subject to acquisition and disposition as prescribed by the Geneva Convention.
76
  
C.8.As to the types of financial instruments, the Geneva Convention does not enumerate the qualifying 
as collaterals instruments. Thus, it should be interpreted that eligible collaterals constitute bonds, debt 
instruments, shares, equity instruments, transferrable units other than shares in collective investment 
schemes and securitized derivative instruments.
77
 Since, no restrictive enumeration exists, it can be 
concluded that any financial instrument that arises from the market practice is included in the scope of 
the Geneva Convention, as long as it complies with the imposed criteria.
78
  
C.9.As to the exceptions from the application of the Geneva Convention, cash is explicitly
79
 excluded 
from the material scope.
80
 
C.10.As to the first criterium of applicability, which is the capability of securities to be credited to a 
securities account, this seems like a self-evident prerequisite, since the ‘intermediated securities’, as 
objects of the Geneva Convention, and their character, as ‘intermediated’, are created and acquired with 
the credit of securities to an account, held by an intermediary.
81
  
C.11.As to the second qualification, the capability of securities to be acquired and disposed according to 
the Convention, namely their transferability, depends on the holding of securities with the methods 
specifically addressed in the Geneva Convention.
82
 These are elaborated under Articles 11, 12 and 13 of 
the Geneva Convention, namely debit and credit, agreements with or in favor of the relevant 
intermediaries, designating entries and control agreements.  
Further Limitation of GSC material scope 
C.12.Chapter V of the Geneva Convention, as concerns its material scope, includes provisions with 
optional character. Such an opt-out clause is prescribed under Article 38. In particular, Article 38(2)(b) 
                                                          
75
 UNIDROIT 2003, Study LXXVIII – Doc.7, Summary Report, ‘Harmonised Substantive Rules regarding Securities Held 
with an Intermediary’, at p.p.8-10. 
76
 GSC Official Commentary, par. 1-7. 
77
 GSC Official Commentary, par. 1-10. 
78
 GSC Official Commentary, par. 1-11, Chun, at p.p.39. 
79
 Article 1(a) GSC. 
80
 GSC Official Commentary, par. 1-7. 
81
 Chun, at p.p.40. 
82
 GSC Official Commentary, par. 1-12. 
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refers to a specific category of securities
83
, which could be declared by a State not to apply. This 
category of securities consists of the intermediated securities that are not tradable on a stock exchange or 
a regulated market. Although the Geneva Convention promotes the harmonization of rules on tradable 
securities,
84
 this opt-out clause was drafted to respond to Contracting States, which may have policy 
reasons to exclude non-tradable securities from Chapter V of the Geneva Convention.
85
  
 
COMPARISON OF THE COLLATERAL DIRECTIVE AND GENEVA CONVENTION 
Normal Application  
C.13.The fundamental difference between the two instruments, apart from the disparity as to the 
intermediated character of securities,
86
 is that the Collateral Directive has broader scope of application, 
rationae materiae, because the kinds of financial instruments covered by it are more than those of the 
Geneva Convention, due to the nature and types of the eligible securities. The Geneva Convention 
applies to arrangements where the collateral consists only of interests in intermediated securities, 
whereas the Collateral Directive also permits credit claims and cash as collateral types. 
C.14.A terminological issue should be clarified. This is the different terms that those instruments use. 
The Collateral Directive refers to the eligible types of collateral as ‘cash’, ‘financial instruments’ and 
‘credit claims’ (Article 1(4)(i)), while the Geneva Convention refers to collateral as ‘an interest in 
intermediated securities’(Article 31(1)). This difference is based on the willingness of Geneva 
Convention drafters to cover book-entries in securities accounts not representing full ownership, but a 
limited interest, such as a security interest, usufruct or life interest, which may arise from market 
practice.
87
 The aforementioned disparity is due to the intermediated nature of securities, that constitutes 
a determinative feature in the case of Geneva Convention.  
C.15.As to the structure and wording, the Collateral Directive concentrates the provisions which define 
the material scope of application in one paragraph (Article 1(4)), while the Geneva Convention requires 
the reader to synthesize Articles 1, 31 and 38.  
C.16.As to the central question of what types of securities constitute eligible collateral, the Collateral 
Directive refers to specific types of securities, without providing a definition of securities in general. In 
particular, the Collateral Directive enumerates the types of securities accepted as collateral in a 
restrictive way –‘collateral…shall consist of cash, financial instruments or credit claims’- (Article 
1(4)(i)) and then it defines them (Article 2(1)(d),(e),(o)). On the other hand, the Geneva Convention 
identifies eligible collateral with ‘interests in intermediated securities’ (Article 31(1)). This provision 
refers to article 1 of the Geneva Convention, which, in contrast to the Collateral Directive, provides the 
relevant –and general- definition of ‘securities’ to apply in its whole text. In relation to the content of 
‘securities’, the Geneva Convention states in an indicative, and not in a restrictive, as the Collateral 
                                                          
83
 Chun, p.p.101. 
84
 GSC Official Commentary, par.38-10. This conclusion derives from the combined reading of Articles 31(3)(e) and 1(b), 
which both cover tradable and non-tradable securities. 
85
 GSC Official Commentary, par.38-10. 
86
 See the comparison under A.5. and A.6. 
87
 Draft Commentary, par.1-7. 
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Directive, way the eligible types of collateral, namely ‘any shares, bonds or other financial instruments 
or financial assets’. However, because this definition, unlike the respective provision of the Collateral 
Directive, leaves margin of adding more types of financial assets, pursuant to the current market 
practice
88, it excludes explicitly ‘cash’ from the category of eligible collaterals. Once again89, the 
Geneva Convention prefers to determine the scope by adding exclusions (negative manner), rather than 
stating, in a restrictive manner, the types of collateral, which are included (positive manner of defining), 
as is the case in the Collateral Directive.
90
 By determining only the limits of securities’ eligibility (by 
determining the exclusions), the Geneva Convention drafters restrict the national legislators only as 
concerns the content of the exclusions, and, in this way, they allow the Contracting States to formulate 
the rest of the rule (what is included), according to their domestic standards and practices. On the 
contrary, the EU Member States have no margins of discretion. 
C.17.As to the requirement that the collateral taker is in control of the securities, both the Collateral 
Directive and the Geneva Convention include relevant provisions. Article 2(2) of the Collateral 
Directive considers as eligible only the securities, which are in the possession or under the control of the 
collateral taker. Similarly, Articles 11, 12 and 13 deem a security interest in securities as created, only 
when a debit or credit entry of these securities or an agreement with or in favor of the intermediary has 
taken place and, necessarily, the relevant intermediary has recorded the collateral taker as the holder of 
the interest or the intermediary became the holder of the very security, with the consequence that the 
collateral taker is control of the securities.
91
 However, the disparity between the two legal instruments is 
the use of different terminology, as the Collateral Directive refers explicitly to the need for possession or 
control by the collateral taker, whereas the Geneva Convention implies this requirement, since the latter 
is fulfilled simultaneously with the creation of the security interest in the securities. 
Opt-Out Provisions 
C.18.As to the opt-out clauses, both legal instruments provide such possibilities to their Member States. 
The Collateral Directive provides the Member States with the options to exclude, from the material 
scope, the collateral provider’s own shares or shares in affiliated undertakings or undertakings with only 
purpose the ownership of means of production essential to the collateral provider’s business or the 
ownership of real property (Article 1(4)(b)) and credit claims when the debtor is a consumer or a micro 
or small enterprise (Article 1(4)(c)). On the other hand, the Geneva Convention allows the exclusion 
only of those ‘intermediated securities that are not permitted to be traded on an exchange or regulated 
market’ (Article 38(2)(b)). It is obvious that the difference is detected in the categories of securities, 
which are excluded. While the Collateral Directive allows the opt-out of shares of the collateral 
provider’s company and credit claims against consumer debtors, the Geneva Convention permits the 
exclusion only of non-tradable intermediated securities.  
C.19.The Collateral Directive considers tradability as a prerequisite for securities to be eligible, in 
contrast to the Geneva Convention, which accepts the exclusion of tradable securities. Moreover, the 
                                                          
88
 See par.C.6. 
89
 The negative way, in which the GSC defines its scope, also appears in the personal scope. See par.B.7. and B.9.. 
90
 This should be deemed as a practical application of the functional and also of the minimal approaches, adopted by the 
Geneva Convention. 
91
 Zacaroli, at p.p.184. 
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Collateral Directive opt-outs concern categories of persons (collateral provider’s company etc and 
consumers), from which the securities (directly or indirectly) derive, whereas the Geneva Convention 
exclusion regards a specific function of securities, the tradability. However, in both cases, the opt-out 
clauses are added to address policy concerns. The difference is that the Collateral Directive pursues to 
protect the collateral provider from the economic unbalance, occurring in case of financial degradation 
of the company of the collateral provider, and serve consumer policy concerns, while the Geneva 
Convention responds to its Contracting States’ policy reasons, regarding the publicly traded securities in 
the national intermediated system.
92
 
C.20.Furthermore, the Geneva Convention opt-out bears an absolute wording, with the meaning that it 
does not permit Contracting States to change the content of the declaration for non-application, in 
relation to how this declaration is drafted under Article 38(2)(b).
93
 In particular, a Contracting State may 
exclude only ‘the intermediated securities that are not permitted to be traded on an exchange or 
regulated market’. It is argued that the strict opt-out is not the case in the Collateral Directive, whose 
first opt-out (Article 1(4)(b)) leaves discretion to the Member States to decide which case to exclude 
from the material scope (collateral provider's own shares, shares in affiliated undertakings, and shares in 
undertakings whose exclusive purpose is to own means of production that are essential for the collateral 
provider's business or to own real property).
94
 This can be deducted from the commas between the 
categories (‘Member States may exclude…collateral consisting of…collateral provider’s own shares, 
shares in affiliated undertakings, and shares in undertakings, whose exclusive purpose…to own means 
of production..or to own real property’). 
 
  
                                                          
92
 GSC Official Commentary, par.29-14, 31-26, 38-10. 
93
 Chun, p.p.101. 
94
 Chun, p.p.101. However, the writer of this Dissertation disagrees with Chun’s view. Since the aim of Article 1(4)(b) is to 
protect the collateral provider from the repercussions of its own financial degradation, any case in which the financial 
degradation of the shares issuer affects the collateral provider should be included or excluded, and such are all the cases that 
Article 1(4)(b) mentions. According to the Dissertation writer’s view there is no difference as to the absolute character of the 
opt-out.  
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D. MATERIAL SCOPE- RELEVANT OBLIGATIONS 
 
i) The Financial Collateral Directive 
D.1.The Collateral Directive also refers to the obligation which is secured by the financial collateral 
arrangement and specifies the qualifications of this obligation. In particular, under Article 2(1)(f), it 
denominates the obligations which are secured by a financial collateral arrangement as ‘relevant 
financial obligations’ and presents their attributes, in an exemplary way,95 in relation to three 
parameters, in order to ensure that various types of obligations are included.  
1)According to the first parameter, the relevant obligations are viewed ratione temporis, and are 
considered acceptable by the Collateral Directive, if they are ‘present or future, actual or contingent or 
prospective obligations (including those arising under a master agreement or similar agreement’ (Article 
2(1)(f)(i)). Thus, the Collateral Directive covers relevant obligations, irrespective of when they were 
created - existing (present, actual) and also future (future, contingent, prospective), even if the latter are 
not even known at the time of the arrangement-
96
.  
2)The second parameter is the ratione personae perspective, pursuant to which the collateral may cover 
an obligation owed not by its collateral provider, but by another, third, person (Article 2(1)(f)(ii)). 
Therefore, some effects of the Collateral Directive can be indirectly extended to other persons.  
3)The third parameter refers to the type of the relevant obligations and states clearly that the material 
scope of the Collateral Directive includes obligations of specified classes, but also periodic obligations 
(‘arising from time to time’) (Article 2(1)(f)(iii)). 
D.2.The only limitation, that the Collateral Directive imposes, concerns the manner in which the 
relevant obligations are extinguished. Article 2(1)(f) requires that the collateral taker is entitled under 
the secured transaction to request ‘cash settlement and/or delivery of financial instruments’ (Article 
2(1)), so that the collateral provider can perform its obligations only in the aforementioned manner. 
 
ii) Chapter V of Geneva Securities Convention 
D.3.Chapter V of the Geneva Convention is also concerned with the underlying transaction, as the basis 
of the collateral agreement. In particular, Article 31(3)(d) Geneva Convention defines ‘relevant 
obligations’ as ‘any…. obligations of the collateral provider or another person’ to the collateral taker, so 
the collateral provider can secure the obligations of a third party.
97
 In the definition are mentioned also 
some attributes of the relevant obligations as regards the time of their genesis, namely to the notion of 
‘relevant obligations’ belong existing, future and contingent obligations or in other words obligations 
irrespective of when they arose.   
D.4.As to the notion of ‘relevant obligations’, Chapter V does not seem to exclude any category of 
relevant obligations, since no such provision exists. However, in order to respond to the different 
                                                          
95
 Chun, p.p.143. 
96
 GSC Official Commentary, par..31-24, which refers to the notion of contingent obligations in general. 
97
 GSC Official Commentary, par.31-23. 
   
INTERNATIONAL HELLENIC UNIVERSITY 
 
  
19 
II. COMPATIBILITY OF THE EU FINANCIAL COLLATERAL DIRECTIVE AND CHAPTER V OF THE 
GENEVA SECURITIES CONVENTION 
national policies,
98
 it leaves the addition of exclusions to the discretion of the Contracting States. In fact, 
under Article 38(2)(c), the Geneva Convention introduces a provision, which allows the Contracting 
States to declare that the Geneva Convention will not apply to collateral arrangements which secure 
specific categories of relevant obligations. Those categories are to be defined by the declaring state. 
 
COMPARISON OF THE COLLATERAL DIRECTIVE AND GENEVA CONVENTION 
D.5.As to their systemic position, the provisions on the ‘relevant obligations’ in both instruments, are 
placed under the ‘Definitions’ sections (Article 2(1) of the Collateral Directive and Article 31(3) of the 
Geneva Convention). Thus, the notion of the term has the form of a definition. However, under the 
Collateral Directive, the definition also includes limitations (Article 2(1)(f)first section) and examples 
(Article 2(1)(f)(i),(ii),(iii)), in contrast to the provision of the Geneva Convention which is almost pure 
definition (Article 31(3)(d). 
D.6.As to the types of relevant obligations, both the Collateral Directive and the Geneva Convention 
elaborate on them. The Collateral Directive presents some types of relevant obligations, as examples –in 
order to clarify the application scope-, which are divided in three categories, pursuant to each reference 
point. In particular, the Collateral Directive divides the exemplary types pursuant to the time, when they 
were generated (‘present or future, actual or contingent or prospective obligations’), their debtors 
(‘person other than the collateral provider’) and other elements concerning their performance (‘of a 
specified class or kind arising from time to time’). However, although Article 31(3)(d) of the Geneva 
Convention refers also to when the relevant obligations arise (‘existing, future or contingent’) and to the 
possible debtors of these obligations (‘of a collateral provider or another person’), it does not mention 
further attributes of the relevant obligations, such as the manner of the obligations’ performance in 
contrast to the Collateral Directive. In addition, the wording of Article 31(3)(d) of the Geneva 
Convention, in which the types of obligations are presented, does not seem as referring to examples, as 
is the case in the Collateral Directive (‘relevant financial obligations may consist of or include’), but 
rather as defining the limits of the notion ‘relevant obligations’ (‘any existing, future or contingent 
obligations of a collateral provider or another person’). 
D.7.As to the exceptions from the material scope, both instruments provide for cases of non-application 
but in a different way. The Collateral Directive requires, with positive wording, that the relevant 
obligations have a particular content, namely that they can be performed with ‘cash settlement and/or 
delivery of financial instruments’. This means that any collateral agreement securing a relevant 
obligation not providing for cash settlement and/or delivery of financial instruments is excluded from 
the application of the Collateral Directive (reverse exclusion). On the other hand, Article 38(2)(c) of the 
Geneva Convention also includes an opt-out in relation to ‘relevant obligations’, but with the negative 
wording of ‘shall not apply:…..c) in relation to collateral agreements that relate to relevant 
obligations…’. Furthermore, the Collateral Directive limitation applies automatically, since the 
European Commission drafted a provision with a very specified content, ‘cash settlement and/or 
delivery of financial instruments’, which it imposed to the Member States without allowing any 
                                                          
98
 GSC Official Commentary, par.38-11. 
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discretion to them as to its implementation or formulation of content. On the contrary, the Geneva 
Convention does not impose any limitation by its own motion, but only creates the possibility of 
declaration (‘a Contracting State may declare that this Chapter shall not apply..’), allowing the declaring 
states, first, to decide if they need an exclusion (‘may declare’), and, second, specify which relevant 
obligations should be excluded from the application scope (‘categories as may be specified in the 
declaration’), thus leaving the definitive formulation of the provision to the Contracting States.  
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E. RIGHT OF USE 
 
i) Financial Collateral Directive 
E.1.After strong lobbying efforts by the derivatives and securities-trading unions,
99
 the Collateral 
Directive adopted the established in the United States securities practice
100
 of collateral re-use, in order 
to enhance liquidity, securities flow and cost efficiency inside the European Market.
101
 Under the 
Definitions section of the Collateral Directive the term ‘right of use’ is defined as ‘the right of the 
collateral taker to use and dispose of financial collateral provided under a security financial collateral 
arrangement as the owner of it in accordance with the terms of the security financial collateral 
arrangement’ (Article 2(1)(m)).  
E.2.Although the introduction of the ‘right of use’ in the European legal order was criticized as 
incompatible
102
 with the legal traditions of the Member States,
103
 a special provision was incorporated in 
the body of the Collateral Directive, in order to legitimize and guarantee the validity of the exercise of 
the ‘right of use’, by prohibiting national rules that put into question the validity of the corollary rights 
(Article 5(4)).  
E.3.‘Right of use’ is allowed, though, only under the condition that it is agreed by the parties to the 
collateral agreement (Article 5(1)). 
E.4. The Collateral Directive balances the ‘right of use’ of the collateral taker by imposing an obligation 
on it. Article 5(2) obliges the collateral taker, if it exercises its ‘right of use’, to transfer during the 
period, starting on the day of disposal and ending on the due date for the performance of the relevant 
financial obligations covered by the security financial collateral arrangement, ‘equivalent collateral to 
replace the original financial collateral’. The purpose of this obligation of the collateral taker is to ensure 
that after the disposal of the original collateral, the collateral provider is not left with an unsecured 
claim, because its claim will be secured by the (re-)transfer of the equivalent collateral.
104
  
E.5.The Collateral Directive, under Article 2(1)(i)(ii), defines ‘equivalent collateral’ as:  
1) ‘a payment of the same amount and in the same currency’, if the original collateral is cash, or 
by ‘financial instruments of the same issuer or debtor, forming part of the same issue or class and 
of the same nominal amount, currency and description or’  
2) other assets, if three prerequisites are fulfilled: First, if the collateral consists of financial 
instruments and not cash, second, if the financial collateral arrangement provides so and third, 
                                                          
99
 Erica Johansson, ‘Reuse of Financial Collateral Revisited’, in Louise Gullifer and Jennifer Payne, ‘Intermediated 
Securities: Legal Problems and Practical Issues’, Hart Publishing, 2010, at p.p.152 [hereinafter Johansson]. 
100
T.R.M.P.Keijser, at p.p.186 at 2.1. 
101
 Chun, at p.p.139 and Recital (3)(19) of the Directive 2002/47/EC. 
102
 As T.R.M.P.Keijser analyzes in his book, there are efforts to adapt the notion of the ‘right of use’ to the continental 
principles of proprietary law. The prevalent legal term used in Italian, Dutch, German and Greek law is ‘pignus irregulare’ 
(T.R.M.P.Keijser ZEuP, at p.p.315 and Pergamalis, at p.p36, FN 23), while T.R.M.P.Keijser proposes the notion of a ‘general 
right of disposal’ (at p.p.231 and 235 and forth). The view of the writer of this Dissertation is that it should be deemed as an 
‘mixed-type contract’ (gemischter Verträge), consisting of a normal pledge under the resolutory condition of the exercise of 
the second part of the contract, which would be a ‘Call Option’, being given effect when the collateral taker, who has the 
right but not the obligation (‘right of election to purchase’-  to acquire the ownership of the collateral in order to treat it as its 
owner (therefore also to dispose of it), he exercises this right. 
103
 Erica Johansson, ‘Property Rights in Investment Securities and the Doctrine of Specificity’, Springer 2009, at p.p.17 
[hereinafter Johansson Property]. 
104
 Johansson, at p.p.153, interpreted a contrario. 
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‘following the occurrence of any event relating to or affecting any financial instruments provided 
as financial collateral’.   
E.6.As a complementary to the obligation of the collateral taker for delivery of ‘equivalent collateral’, 
Article 5(2) introduces an alternative obligation for the collateral taker, if the (re)transfer of the 
equivalent collateral is not conducted during the aforementioned period (from the day of the exercise of 
the ‘right of use’ to the due date of the performance of the relevant obligations). The collateral taker has 
a ‘last chance’ to compensate the provider on the due date for the performance of the relevant financial 
obligations. That is to ‘either transfer equivalent collateral, or, if and to the extent that the terms of a 
security financial collateral arrangement so provide, set off the value of the equivalent collateral against 
or apply it in discharge of the relevant financial obligations’.105  
E.7.The Collateral Directive also allows the application of the ‘close-out netting’ provision (Article 7), 
if the collateral taker has not (re)transferred the equivalent collateral to the collateral provider and an 
‘enforcement event’ occurs before the due date for the performance of the relevant obligations comes 
(Article 5(5)). )). As ‘enforcement event’ is considered an ‘event of default or any similar event as 
agreed between the parties on the occurrence of which, under the terms of a financial collateral 
arrangement ….., ……. a close-out netting provision comes into effect’ (Article 2(1)(l)). However, even 
the ‘close-out netting’ may not compensate the collateral provider, if, in the meantime between the 
exercise of the ‘right of use’ and the occurrence of the ‘enforcement event’, the prices of the original 
collateral have substantially increased and no margin agreements to balance the exposures exist.
106
   
E.8.As to the legal regime of the ‘equivalent collateral’, Article 5(3) of the Collateral Directive requires 
that the equivalent assets are subject to the same terms of the collateral agreement as the ‘original 
collateral’ and are considered as having being owned by the collateral provider from the outset of the 
transaction (‘proprietary substitution’).  The ‘proprietary substitution’ produces effects also for the 
collateral taker, who is deemed to have a security interest on the ‘equivalent collateral’ from the 
beginning of the transaction. 
E.9.As concerns the rights of the collateral provider after the exercise of the ‘right of use’ on behalf of 
the collateral taker, the former remains with a contractual claim (right in personam) after the latter 
exercises its ‘right of use’, because the collateral provider’s bond with the original collateral (right in 
rem) is broken.
107 The collateral provider does not seem to be granted with any equity of redemption, 
such as the revival of its property rights in the ‘original collateral’.108 In other words, if the collateral 
taker does not deliver ‘equivalent collateral’, the collateral provider is left with an unsecured claim,109 
which means that in case of the collateral taker’s insolvency, it will be satisfied pari passu with the other 
unsecured creditors.
110
 However, the contractual claim of the collateral provider can be set-off against 
the relevant obligation (Article 5(2) second subparagraph) on the due date for the performance of the 
                                                          
105
 But see Johansson Property, at p.p.16, where she interprets the provision as “at best can be set-off against the underlying 
obligation at least until the equivalent collateral has been acquired or transferred”. The writer is of the opinion that there is 
no standing possibility of set-off, since the wording of the provision states “on the due date”, interpreted as the specific day 
when the relevant obligations are agreed to be discharged. 
106
 T.R.M.P.Keijser, at p.p.179. 
107
 Johansson Property, at p.p.15. 
108
 Johansson Property, at p.p16 and Johansson, at p.p.153. 
109
 Johansson, at p.p.153. 
110
 Johansson, at p.p.153. 
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relevant obligations or it can be submitted to ‘close-out netting’ with the value of the relevant 
obligations if an enforcement event takes place.
111
 The problem of the collateral provider arises in the 
case of over-collateralization, which takes place either when the collateral provider has posted too much 
collateral or the price of the original collateral increased significantly.
112
 
 In any case, though, it can be assumed that the balance between the parties to the collateral agreement is 
distorted, since the collateral taker is secured throughout the whole duration of the transaction –initially, 
with the original collateral and then, with the maintenance of its right of use also in the ‘equivalent 
collateral’ (‘proprietary substitution’)-, while the collateral provider is left basically unsecured and the 
possibility of it being secured at some point in the course of the transaction depends on the collateral 
taker, if and when it delivers the ‘equivalent collateral’.113 Otherwise, it is obliged to wait for the due 
date for the performance of the relevant obligations to come, so that it can be secured with the 
‘equivalent collateral’ or set-off. But even if the collateral provider applies the alternative remedy of set-
off or the close-out netting, it bears the risk of partial compensation, if there is insufficiency of the 
collateral taker’s assets.  
 
ii) Chapter V of Geneva Securities Convention 
E.10,For reasons of promoting the use of services, such as securities lending and prime brokerage 
arrangements,
114
 of pursuing more financial growth, secured finance and securities-trading 
optimization,
115
 the Geneva Convention regulates the collateral taker’s ‘right of use’ (Article 34), and 
obliges the Contracting States to ensure that the exercise of the ‘right of use’ will not render invalid or 
unenforceable the rights arising out of its exercise (Article 34(4)). The Geneva Convention derogates 
from the national laws, which prohibit the disposal of the assets when they are given as collateral, under 
a pledge contract, to secure the recourse of the collateral provider to the collateral.
116
  
E.11.Article 34(1) features the definition of the right of use as the collateral taker’s ‘right to use and 
dispose of the collateral securities as if it were the owner of them’, ‘if and to the extent that the terms of 
a security collateral agreement so provide’. This means that, only if the collateral provider has provided 
its consent under the collateral agreement, the collateral taker can sell the collateral, lend it, pledge it to 
a third party or dispose of it in any other way.
117
 
 E.12.Article 34 also specifies the obligations arising, when the collateral taker exercises its ‘right of 
use’ by using or disposing of the already provided collateral (‘original collateral securities’). 
Accordingly, the collateral taker is obliged to transfer to the collateral provider, in order to avoid leaving 
the latter unsecured, the following assets:  
a) ‘Equivalent collateral’, with the meaning of ‘securities of the same description as collateral 
securities’ (Article 31(3)(i)), or 
                                                          
111
 Johansson Property, at p.p16. 
112
 Johansson, at p.p.153 and T.R.M.P.Keijser, at p.p.179. 
113
 This imbalance becomes provocative, when collateral-takers are powerful banks and collateral providers are small and 
medium sized enterprises, see Johansson Property, at p.p16. 
114
 GSC Official Commentary, par.34-13. 
115
 GSC Official Commentary, par.34-1. 
116
 GSC Official Commentary, par.34-12. 
117
 GSC Official Commentary, par.34-13. 
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b) Other assets, ‘if the security collateral agreement provides for the delivery of other assets’ 
(Article 34(2)), but such ‘other assets’ may be provided only ‘following the occurrence of any 
event relating to or affecting any securities delivered as collateral’, when ‘securities of the same 
description as the original collateral’ (Article 31(3)(i)) are hardly or not available, such as in the 
case of a merger or a take-over concerning the issuing company. Thus, the provision of ‘other 
assets’ is a restricted possibility. 
Both ‘equivalent collateral’ and ‘other assets’ are qualifying as ‘replacement collateral’. 
E.13.The ‘replacement collateral’ should be provided inside a specific timeframe. Chapter V of the 
Geneva Convention requires the delivery of the ‘replacement collateral’ to be done not later than the 
discharge of the relevant obligations (Article 34(2)). Thus, the obligation of (re-)transfer exists from the 
moment of the exercise of the ‘right of use’, with the disposal of the original collateral, until the moment 
of the actual discharge of relevant obligations.
118
 
E.14.For the case, when an ‘enforcement event’ occurs during the period, in which the obligation for the 
delivery of ‘replacement collateral’ remains outstanding and the relevant obligations have not been 
discharged yet, Article 34 contains no provision. Instead, all enforcement issues are dealt under Article 
33, which provides under Paragraph 2 for ‘close-out netting’ as a solution to the aforementioned case. 
As ‘enforcement event’, Chapter V considers ‘in relation to a collateral agreement, an event of default or 
other event on the occurrence of which, under the terms of that collateral agreement..,a close-out netting 
provision may be operated’ (Article 31(3)(h)). Although, the ‘close-out netting’ can be a form of 
redemption for the collateral provider, there is the risk that the latter suffers a loss, if the value of the 
‘replacement collateral’ which should have been transferred is higher than that of the relevant 
obligations.
119
  
E.15.As to the rights in the ‘replacement collateral’, Article 34(3) of the Geneva Convention provides 
that the same terms and manner as the original collateral are applied also to the ‘replacement collateral’ 
and that the latter is provided with retroactive force, namely its delivery should be considered as 
performed from the same temporal moment,
120
 as in the case of the original collateral.
121
. The rationale 
behind this rule is the exclusion of the possibility that the ‘replacement collateral’ is presented as new, 
with the respective legal consequences, especially in the priority of security interests.
122
 
E.16.It should be highlighted, that the collateral taker’s ‘right of use’ may have an adverse impact on the 
legal situation of the collateral provider, who loses its proprietary interest in the ‘original collateral’, 
being left only with a contractual claim until the moment, when the collateral taker delivers 
‘replacement collateral’.123 
However, the Geneva Convention with its provision under Recital 10 of its Preamble, allows the 
Contracting States to limit the ‘right of use’ in their territories, through the imposition of regulatory or 
                                                          
118
 GSC Official Commentary, par.34-3. 
119
 GSC Official Commentary, par.34-15. 
120
 Thus, replacement collateral is subject to an interest, which is estimated from the time it would be estimated for the 
original collateral and under the provisions of the collateral agreement for the original collateral (Article 34(3)(a)). 
121
 GSC Official Commentary, par.34-4. 
122
 GSC Official Commentary, par.34-16. 
123
 GSC Official Commentary, par.34-1. 
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supervisory restrictions, for reasons of investor protection and prevention of excess liquidity, as long as 
the provisions of the Geneva Convention are not contravened.
124
 In other words, the Contracting States 
may impose permanent or temporary restrictions on the ‘right of use’, as long as these respect the core 
rules of the Geneva Convention and have as purpose to protect the investors and the financial system.
125
 
It can be deducted that the ‘right of use’ cannot be annulated by the Contracting States, but it can be 
complemented with more or stricter obligations, which a Contracting State may be willing to impose to 
the collateral takers, such as the obligation to conduct a set-off against or apply the value of the 
‘replacement collateral’ in discharge of the relevant financial obligations. 
 
COMPARISON OF THE COLLATERAL DIRECTIVE AND GENEVA CONVENTION 
E.17.From a teleological perspective, both the Collateral Directive and the Geneva Convention include 
provisions for the ‘right of use’ for an identical reason, the enhancement of liquidity in the financial 
market, by facilitating the circulation of collateral and the optimization of its use with the legitimization 
of the re-use method. In order to achieve the aforementioned legitimization, both legal instruments 
impose to the Member or Contracting States the obligation to ensure that the exercise of the ‘right of 
use’ does not render invalid or unenforceable the rights of the collateral taker under the relevant 
collateral agreement (Article 5(4) of the Collateral Directive and Article 34(4) of the Geneva 
Convention). 
E.18.As to the structure, Article 5 of the Collateral Directive leads to the Definitions section (Article 2), 
where the ‘right of use’ is explained (Article 2(1)(m). On the other hand, Chapter V of the Geneva 
Convention presents the notion of ‘right of use’ only under Article 34. In addition, regarding the ‘close-
out netting’ provisions, the Collateral Directive contains a close-out netting provision tailored to the 
right of use (Article 5(5)), the Geneva Convention deals with close-out netting in the context of Article 
33, relating to enforcement generally. 
E.19.As to the terminology used, a slight difference exists: while the Geneva Convention considers as 
‘replacement collateral’, the ‘equivalent collateral’ and the ‘other assets’ (Article 34(2)), and as 
‘equivalent collateral’ securities of same description as the original ones (Article 31(3)(i)), the Collateral 
Directive has one definition, that for the ‘equivalent collateral’, which includes both the securities of 
same characteristics with the original collateral and the other assets (Article 2(1)(i)). 
E.20.As concerns the types of the ‘equivalent’ or ‘replacement’ collateral,126 both the Collateral 
Directive and the Geneva Convention include provisions allowing ‘other assets’ as ‘equivalent’ or 
‘replacement collateral’, if certain events take place and if the collateral agreement provides for it. The 
only difference is that the Collateral Directive allows the provision of ‘other assets’ only if the original 
collateral was financial instruments and not cash. The choice between financial instruments and cash 
                                                          
124
 GSC Official Commentary, par.34-3. 
125
 See GSC Official Commentary, par.34-13. 
126
 Johansson argues that the Geneva Convention “goes further than Article 5 of the Financial Collateral Directive in that 
….(it) gives the parties the right to agree to deliver collateral of a different type than the collateral originally provided”. See 
Johansson, at p.p.160. This is not entirely accurate, as the Collateral Directive also provides for ‘other assets’, if the original 
collateral consists of financial instruments, under certain circumstances and if the parties have agreed relevantly. See above 
E.1.a). 
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would not be possible under the Geneva Convention, since the latter does not include cash in its material 
scope. 
E.21.As to the substantive law, both legal instruments provide for a new rule, common in both. The rule 
is the introduction of the right of the collateral taker to use the collateral provided by the collateral 
provider (Article 5(1) of the Collateral Directive and Article 34(1) of the Geneva Convention. Both of 
these instruments, though, add a limitation to the ‘right of use’, according to which ‘party autonomy’ 
can only legitimize the ‘right of use’ and its exercise, namely this right can be exercised only when this 
is agreed by the parties to the collateral agreement, more specifically, when there is the collateral 
provider’s consent to the ‘right of use’. Moreover, both instruments introduce an obligation 
complementary to the right of use, according to which after the exercise of this right the collateral taker 
bears the obligation to re-transfer back to the collateral provider equivalent or replacement collateral 
(Article 5(2) of the Collateral Directive and Article 34(2) of the Geneva Convention).  
E.22. However, slight differences are detected in the provisions of those legal instruments, regarding the 
delivery of ‘equivalent’ or ‘replacement collateral’. 
E.23.As concerns the period in which the ‘equivalent’ or ‘replacement collateral’ should be provided, 
under the Collateral Directive, the collateral taker can perform its obligation for provision of ‘equivalent 
collateral’ from the date it exercised its ‘right of use’, until and on the due date for the performance of 
the relevant financial obligations (Article 5(2)first subparagraph). The Geneva Convention, though, 
provides that the delivery of the ‘replacement collateral’ should take place after the date, when the ‘right 
of use’ was exercised, but ‘not later than the discharge of the relevant obligations’.  It is not clarified if 
the ‘discharge’ term represents a date or a period, but it is argued that the ‘discharge’ refers to the actual 
fulfillment of the collateral taker’s obligations and can concur with the due date of performance, but it 
can also occur earlier or even later than the due date.
127
 However, if the parties have drafted the 
collateral arrangement properly, this disparity between the above terms (‘due date’ and ‘discharge’) is 
unlikely to have practical consequences, because non-performance on the ‘due date’ shall usually trigger 
close-out netting and thus lead to the ‘discharge of the relevant obligations’. 
E.24.As to the case, in which the collateral taker has not delivered the ‘equivalent’ or ‘replacement 
collateral’ until the due date for the performance of the relevant obligations, the Collateral Directive 
provides three alternative choices. Apart from the transfer of the ‘equivalent collateral’, the Collateral 
Directive states that, if the parties have agreed and to the extent they have done so, the collateral taker 
can, on the due date for the performance of the relevant obligations, either set off the value of the 
‘equivalent collateral’ against or apply it in discharge of the relevant financial obligations (Article 5(2) 
second subparagraph). Nevertheless, Chapter V of the Geneva Convention is silent on the possibilities of 
set-off and of application in discharge. There is Article 30, but this allows set-off but only in case of 
insolvency. However, the Geneva Convention contains a provision in its Preamble (Recital 10), which 
allows the Contracting States to limit the rights deriving from the exercise of the ‘right of use’ on behalf 
of the collateral taker, and consequently to provide more protection to the collateral provider. In these 
                                                          
127
 Chun, at p.p.143 and Johansson, at p.p.160. 
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frames, practices such as the set-off or the application in discharge could be accepted by the Geneva 
Convention.   
E.25.As to the close-out netting possibility, both the Collateral Directive, under Article 5(5), and the 
Geneva Convention, under Article 33(2), confirm the availability of ‘close-out netting’ between the 
relevant obligations on behalf of the collateral taker and the obligation for the delivery of ‘equivalent 
collateral’ on behalf of the collateral taker, if an ‘enforcement event’ occurs. As to the meaning of the 
‘enforcement event’, it is almost identical in both legal instruments, defined as an event of default or any 
similar/other event as agreed between the parties/under the terms of the collateral agreement on the 
occurrence of which, under the terms of a financial collateral arrangement, a close-out netting provision 
comes into effect/may be operated (Article 5(5) of the Collateral Directive and Article 31(3)(h) of the 
Geneva Convention). 
E.26.By providing for ‘replacement collateral’ delivery until the actual discharge of the relevant 
obligations, the Geneva Convention deteriorates the legal position of the collateral provider for two 
reasons: first, the discharge may occur later than the due date of performance or may take place in parts, 
with the consequence that the collateral provider remains without or with partial recourse to an asset 
until that later stage, having only a contractual claim against the collateral taker, and second, that 
provision exerts indirect pressure to the collateral provider, as it moves the burden for the earliest 
possible performance on the latter, which should try to perform the relevant obligations as soon as 
possible in order to re-gain a recourse on an asset. In relation to these effects, the Collateral Directive 
seems more collateral provider-friendly, as it limits the non-delivery of ‘equivalent collateral’ by the 
collateral taker to the due date.  
E.27.Moreover, both legal instruments, with a slight difference in wording, accept the ‘proprietary 
substitution’, namely they both are of the view that the securities delivered as ‘equivalent’ or 
‘replacement collateral’ should be subject to the same legal regime as the ‘original collateral’, in 
particular to the same terms as the ‘original collateral’ and with retroactive force –from the outset of the 
transaction- (Article 5(3) of the Collateral Directive and Article 34(3) of the Geneva Convention).  
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F. TRIGGERS FOR THE PROVISION OF TOP-UP COLLATERAL 
 
i) Financial Collateral Directive 
F.1.The Collateral Directive pursues to maintain the economic balance between the parties to the 
collateral agreement.
128
 In this context, the Collateral Directive recognizes and protects from the ‘timing 
claw back rule’ clauses, which aim at keeping the parties’ exposures to the minimum,129 by imposing on 
the collateral provider and the collateral taker, the obligation to post additional collateral or financial 
collateral, respectively (‘top-up collateral’-Article 8(3)(a)). The obligation for provision of additional 
collateral and financial collateral should be included in the collateral arrangement, namely should be a 
result of parties’ consent.  
F.2.Both ‘top-up’ provisions have two aspects:  
1) The provision of additional collateral constitutes an obligation on behalf of the collateral 
provider and a right in favor of the collateral taker, and has as its purpose the mitigation of the 
exposure of the collateral taker, if the value of the ‘original collateral’ decreases or if the value of 
the relevant obligations increases, and  
2) The provision of financial collateral constitutes a right in favor of the collateral provider and an 
obligation on behalf of the collateral taker to post financial collateral –for the first time- in order 
to return the excessive value of the ‘original collateral’ to the collateral provider, if the value of 
the ‘original collateral’ increases or if the value of the relevant obligations decreases. 
Since both cases of margin transfers provide rights and obligations for both parties to the collateral 
agreement, the collateral provider and the collateral taker, it can be assumed that the Collateral Directive 
provides for protection in both directions of the financial collateral relationship, in its pursuit of 
economic balance between the parties to the collateral arrangement. 
F.3.In Article 8(3)(a), the Collateral Directive specifies the standard, on the basis of which the provision 
of ‘top-up’ collateral is conducted. This standard is the occurrence of ‘changes in the value of the 
financial collateral or in the amount of the relevant financial obligations’. In other words, the exposure 
of the parties is allowed to be covered with margin transfers, only due to the objective reason of the 
price fluctuations in the market.
130
 Thus, other cases, such as the occurrence of changes in the rating of 
the creditworthiness of one of the parties, are not considered as standards triggering the provision of 
‘top-up’ collateral. 
F.4.This limitation derives from the view of the European Commission that possible degradation of the 
creditworthiness status of the additional collateral provider would endanger its solvency and in case of a 
relevant failure, the protection provided by the Collateral Directive to the additional collateral taker 
would undermine the position of other creditors of the collateral provider.
131
 However, it is possible that 
the aforementioned limitation can be circumvented, when the collateral provider’s creditworthiness is 
                                                          
128
 Recital (5) of the Directive 2002/47/EC, T.R.M.P.Keijser, at p.p.75. 
129
 T.R.M.P.Keijser, at p.p.76. 
130
 T.R.M.P.Keijser, at p.p 75. 
131
 T.R.M.P.Keijser, at p.p 75-76. 
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directly linked with the value of the collateral and such as in the case when the collateral provider is a 
company giving as collateral its own shares.
132
 In fact, the avoidance of such a contingency could be the 
rationale, behind the provision of Article 1(4)(b) of the Collateral Directive, which allows the exclusion 
of this kind of securities from the material scope of the Collateral Directive.
133
  
 
ii) Chapter V of Geneva Securities Convention 
F.5.The issue of losses due to the exposures of parties to a financial collateral agreement is also 
addressed by the Geneva Convention, which allows the mitigation of these exposures by margin 
transfers and exempts those margin transfers from the retroactive force of insolvency (Article 36(1)(a)). 
The recognition and protection of the ‘top-up’ collateral transfers by the Geneva Convention can take 
place, only if the obligations for the margin transfers are agreed by the parties in their arrangement.  
F.6.Article 36(1)(a) allows those collateral arrangement clauses, which provide for the provision of 
additional collateral securities, in case of change in the balance of the parties’ exposures. Noteworthy is 
that Article 36(1)(a) refers to the provision only of additional collateral and not also of financial 
collateral. From this wording, what can be deducted is that there is only one obligation and one right in 
relation to the provision of additional collateral. Since the delivery of additional collateral requires 
previous delivery of ‘original collateral’, it is obvious that the obligation is imposed on the collateral 
taker, who provides the ‘original collateral’, and the right is created in favor of the collateral taker. As it 
derives from the wording of Article 36(1)(a), the latter bears no obligation of margin transfer. Therefore, 
it can be argued that Article 36 protects the collateral relationship only towards one direction, that of the 
collateral taker. 
F.7.The Geneva Convention accepts margin transfers, for the balancing of the collateral taker’s exposure 
only if the latter arises from the following events
134
: 
i. There are ‘changes in the value of the collateral delivered under the collateral agreement or in the 
amount of the relevant obligations’ (Article 36(1)(a)(i)), arising out of the comparison between 
the value of the original collateral at the time of its delivery and the value of the original 
collateral at the time, when the additional collateral is provided.
135
 The value of the relevant 
obligations is estimated in relation to the value of the collateral securing them.
136
 In other words, 
under this provision, an objective criterium, such as a change in the market prices, can trigger a 
margin transfer to cover the collateral taker’s exposure. 
ii. An increase takes place ‘in the credit risk incurred by the collateral taker as determined by 
reference to objective criteria relating to the creditworthiness, financial performance or financial 
condition of the collateral provider or other person by whom the relevant obligations are owned’. 
In this case, object of the estimation are not the collaterals or the relevant obligations, but the 
                                                          
132
 GSC Official Commentary, par.36-14, referring to the specific example. 
133
 See par. C.2.(a). 
134
 GSC Official Commentary, par.36-12. 
135
 GSC Official Commentary, par.36-13. 
136
 GSC Official Commentary, par.36-15.  
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very entity of the collateral provider or the debtor of the ‘relevant obligations’.137 In particular, 
the outcome, as to the increase of collateral taker’s credit risk, will not arise out of 
objective
138
and quantitative parameters, but out of their connection to a single subject
139
 
(qualitative criterium). 
 Article 36(1)(a)(ii) is deemed challenging for jurisdictions, which are highly concerned with 
insolvency issues, especially with the equality of insolvency creditors -paritas creditorum- and 
the avoidance of fraud against them, as the deterioration of the financial condition may omen 
insolvency
140
. Therefore, the drafters of the Geneva Convention recognized that some 
Contracting States would be unwilling to incorporate Article 36(1)(a)(ii), so they introduced an 
exclusion possibility
141
. Accordingly, Article 36(2) leaves to the discretion of the Contracting 
States the choice to apply the creditworthiness standard in their territory, if they consider the 
protection of the collateral taker in case of the collateral provider’s credit risk deterioration as 
unworthy of being excluded from the ‘zero hour rule’.142  
iii. Finally, the Geneva Convention applies to collateral arrangements providing for provision of 
additional collateral, when other circumstances occur, which are agreed and specified by the 
parties to the collateral agreement, to the extent permitted by the law applicable
143
 to the 
collateral agreement.
144
 The crucial issues of this provision are first, that the insolvency benefit 
of ‘timing claw back rule’ of the Geneva Convention can be extended to more cases,145 
depending on the free will of the parties (parties’ autonomy) and second, that the only limitation 
to their parties’ autonomy is the applicable law of the collateral arrangement146. More 
specifically, the Geneva Convention does not impose limits or criteria by its own motion to the 
applicability of arrangements including obligations for additional collateral to cases of 
indeterminate number and content. It moves the burden of ‘watchdog’ to the national legislators, 
which are responsible to apply their ius cogens and determine the scope of application of this 
specific provision. 
 
COMPARISON OF THE COLLATERAL DIRECTIVE AND GENEVA CONVENTION 
F.8. From a structural point of view, there is a difference in the position of the ‘top-up’ provisions in 
each legal instrument. While the Collateral Directive places the triggers of margin transfers and their 
protection under an article with general title and content (Article 8- ‘Certain Insolvency Provisions 
Disapplied’), the Geneva Convention includes an autonomous article, Article 36, for the regulation of 
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 GSC Official Commentary, par.36-18. 
138
 GSC Official Commentary, par.36-18. 
139
 GSC Official Commentary, par.36-19. 
140
 GSC Official Commentary, par.36-20. 
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 GSC Official Commentary, par.36-20. 
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 Mooney- Kanda, at p.p.128. 
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 In the text of the GSC it is referred to as ‘Non-Convention law’, which according to art.1(m)GSC is the substantive law of 
the Contracting State. However, in the Official Commentary it is interpreted as the “substantive law of the Contracting State, 
which may apply…”. 
144
 Article 36(1)(a). 
145
 GSC Official Commentary, par.36-21. 
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 In the text of the GSC it is referred to as ‘Non-Convention law’, which according to Article 1(m) is the substantive law of 
the Contracting State. However, in the Official Commentary it is interpreted as the “substantive law of the Contracting State, 
which may apply…”. 
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margin transfers, which contains all relevant provisions as to the requirements of title transfers, the cases 
which trigger them and their protection from insolvency rules. 
F.9.From a view of substantive law, both legal instruments recognize and protect form the ‘timing claw 
back rule’ the obligation for the delivery of financial or additional collateral, in order to mitigate the 
exposures of the parties to the collateral agreement, under the condition, though, that the aforementioned 
obligation is agreed by the parties in the collateral agreement. 
F.10.While both legal instruments regulate margin transfers in order to protect the parties to a collateral 
agreement from the losses which they may suffer due to the increase of their exposures, the scope of 
protection differs. The Collateral Directive contains protective rules in both directions of a collateral 
transaction, as it provides for the delivery of both financial collateral and additional collateral, which 
means that both the collateral provider and the collateral taker are entitled to receive collateral, in case of 
exposure. On the contrary, Article 36 of the Geneva Convention grants protection only towards the one 
direction of a collateral arrangement, since according to its rules only the collateral taker is entitled to 
additional collateral to cover its exposure. 
F.11.Another discrepancy is detected in the content of the ‘triggers’ of ‘top-up’ collateral provision. The 
Collateral Directive includes only one, in contrast to the three cases, which are elaborated by the Geneva 
Convention.  
F.12.As to the first trigger, judging from the text of both the Collateral Directive and Geneva 
Convention, Article 8(3)(a) of the Collateral Directive and Article 36(1)(a)(i) of the Geneva Convention, 
have almost identical content and wording (‘in order to take account of changes in the value of the 
financial collateral or in the amount of the relevant financial obligations’ and ‘in order to take account of 
changes in the value of the collateral delivered under the collateral agreement or in the amount of the 
relevant obligations’). In other words, both legal instruments recognize obligations for the provision of 
financial or additional collaterals, in case of marking-to-market exposures.  
F.13.The creditworthiness of the collateral provider constitutes the second ‘trigger’ for the provision of 
the additional collateral under the Geneva Convention (Article 36(1)(a)(ii)). The Collateral Directive, 
however, has not incorporated the creditworthiness of the collateral provider as a ‘trigger’ for ‘top-up’ 
collateral, on the grounds that a lower credit rating of the provider could raise fears of insolvency, in 
which case the provision of the ‘top-up’ collateral would be detrimental to the other creditors of the 
collateral provider.
147
 Willing to respond to similar concerns of the Contracting States, the drafters of the 
Geneva Convention added an opt-out provision under Article 36(2), according to which, this ‘trigger’ of 
‘top-up’ collateral can be declared as non-applicable. If a State makes use of this clause, then the 
application scope of the Geneva Convention could approach the relevant application scope of the 
Collateral Directive.
148
  
F.14.As regards the last ‘trigger’ of ‘top-up’ collateral included in the Geneva Convention, this widens 
the scope of application of the Geneva Convention, in contrast to the Collateral Directive, by allowing 
the parties to collateral arrangements to decide the posting of additional collateral on the occurrence of 
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 T.R.M.P.Keijser, at p.p 75-76. 
148
 Chun, at p.p.143. 
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events, which they have personally agreed in the arrangement, if these agreements are not contrary to the 
applicable law of the arrangement (Article 36(1)(a)(iii)).  
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G. TREATMENT AFTER THE DECLARATION OF INSOLVENCY 
 
i) Financial Collateral Directive 
G.1.Article 8 of the Collateral Directive aims at safeguarding the validity of financial collateral 
transactions, if the collateral provider becomes subject to winding-up or reorganization proceedings. In 
winding-up proceedings the person who is unable to pay, has to liquidate all its assets to satisfy the 
claims of its creditors. In order to avoid the conduct of fraud against the latter, most jurisdictions include 
an “actio pauliana”, by which transactions made for the disposal of assets by the insolvent person with 
the purpose of making those assets unavailable to the creditors, can be declared void.
149
 
G.2.The Collateral Directive pursues to save, to the extent possible and justifiable, the validity of 
financial collateral transactions, to which it applies, on the grounds that these transactions have large-
scale impacts
150
 in the economy and can cause systemic risk,
151
 while they are usually conducted 
between unknown entities in a very short time. This thought is hiding behind Article 8, which states in 
paragraph (1) and (3) that the conclusion of financial collateral arrangements and the provision of 
financial collateral and additional financial collateral, are protected from avoidance, if they take place 
prior to the initiation of winding-up proceedings, if no other reasons for avoidance exist.  
G.3.However, Article 8(2) regulates what happens if the conclusion (or the coming into existence) of a 
financial collateral arrangement or of relevant financial obligations, as well as the provision of financial 
collateral take place ‘on the day, but after the moment of the commencement of winding-up procedures 
or reorganization measures’. Those transactions will be ‘legally enforceable and binding on third parties, 
if the collateral taker can prove that it was not aware, nor should have been aware’ of the 
aforementioned situation (Article 8(2)). 
G.4.This provision focuses on the protection of “good faith” (bona fides) of the innocent acquirer, 
namely of the collateral taker
152
. In particular, it aims at protecting a market participant in the financial 
market, from facing an unexpected avoidance of its transaction,
153
 because of its counterparty’s 
declaration of insolvency, of which it was not aware. According to this rationale, the provision is drafted 
so as to have a very limited scope of application: 
a) Material scope: This includes only the conclusion of financial collateral arrangements, the 
conclusion of relevant financial obligations, and the provision of the initial financial collateral, as 
it is agreed in the collateral arrangement. Neither the provision of top-up collaterals, nor the 
substitution of provided collaterals are covered. This omission can be interpreted in two ways: 
Either there is a drafting mismatch or the European Commission intended to restrict the material 
scope of this provision. The first interpretation is based on the argument that if that restriction is 
imposed on the market participants, Article 8(2) will be of little use, because the practical 
importance of this rule relates to the protection of the collateral agreements as a whole, with any 
                                                          
149
 See Lampros E. Kotsiris, ‘Insolvency Law’, Sakkoulas Publications, Athens-Thessaloniki, 7th Edition, 2008, at 
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subsequent obligation, until their termination. The second interpretation relies on the wording of 
the provision. It can be argued that because top-up collateral provision and substitution are dealt 
with under Article 8(3), if the drafters had the intention to extend the possibility of Article 8(2) 
they would add an analogous provision under paragraph 3 or they would draft Article 8(2) with a 
more general wording. In favor of the strict interpretation is also the fact that, when the 
Collateral Directive was amended,
154
 there was no provision changing Article 8(2). 
b) Temporal scope:  This particular provision of Article 8(2) of the Collateral Directive refers to the 
situation, in which the collateral transaction took place ‘on the day of, but after the moment of 
the commencement of, winding-up proceedings or re-organization measures’. This rule is 
innovative and new for some European jurisdictions, because it breaks the taboo of insolvency 
law, namely the presumption that after the declaration of the relevant proceedings, the 
counterparty of the insolvent person was aware of the winding-up proceedings. The reason is the 
extraordinary nature of the financial markets, where multiple market participants from various 
jurisdictions are involved and the transactions between them take place at a very fast pace.   
c) Personal scope: That includes only the collateral takers, which can be considered as ‘innocent 
acquirers’. As such are deemed the collateral takers which were not aware and had no obligation 
to be aware of the commencement of winding-up procedure. However, no more hints are given 
for the notion and the standards of the ‘awareness’ or the ‘duty for awareness’. It should be 
highlighted, however, that the possibility of the collateral taker not being aware is quite small, 
since in financial markets there is immediate information on the potentially insolvent 
participants
155
. 
As a result of the above, the insolvent collateral provider can exclude some of its assets from the 
insolvent state,
156
 even after becoming subject to an insolvency administrator. This provision 
deteriorates the legal status of joint creditors, who aim at being satisfied from the insolvent estate, since 
it deprives them from the possibility of preventing the decrease of the estate assets, in favor of a creditor, 
which has a special category claim, that of financial collateral.
157
 Apart from the practical difficulties 
arising from this situation, it is clear that the Collateral Directive creates a new category of protected-
creditors or beneficiaries, on the basis of them being engaged in financial collateral transactions. This 
fact raises concerns of rule of law and international public order, since according to this specific 
provision the financial collateral takers will be satisfied prior and more easily in relation to other 
creditors belonging to sensitive categories, such as the category of the collateral provider’s employees. 
What is more, since the criterium of ‘good faith’ is quite vague, there is also the risk of the abuse of 
Article 8(2),
158
 if used as a ‘Trojan horse’ for the conduct of fraud against the insolvent estate creditors.  
 
ii) Chapter V of Geneva Securities Convention 
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G.5.In Chapter V of the Geneva Convention there are two articles, Articles 36 and 37, concerning the 
validity of a financial collateral transaction in relation to the commencement of insolvency proceedings 
against the collateral provider. 
G.6.The first, Article 36, concerns the effects of the delivery of top-up collateral in relation to the 
collateral provider’s declaration of insolvency. According to this, the validity of the top-up delivery is 
protected, if the top-up provision takes place ‘during a prescribed period before, or on the day but 
before’ the declaration of collateral provider’s insolvency (Article 36(1)(b)). This provision includes 
nothing about the validity of the top-up collateral provision after the initiation of insolvency 
proceedings, and such a silence should be interpreted as not covering collateral provisions after the 
declaration of insolvency and as leaving the regulation of the issue to the discretion of the Contracting 
State.
159
 
G.7.The second provision, Article 37, covers every other collateral transaction that is not inside the 
scope of application of Article 36 –top-up collaterals-, namely the conclusion of collateral agreements or 
the delivery of collateral securities. As in Article 36, Article 37 refers to the same temporal scope, which 
is the prescribed period before or the day of the commencement of insolvency, but until the time when 
the latter takes place, and thus, should be interpreted likewise, as not covering the collateral provision or 
the conclusion of a collateral agreement after the commencement of collateral provider’s insolvency and 
leaving the issue to the national legislator. 
G.8.However, the Geneva Convention includes a special article, which applies to acquisitions by 
‘innocent acquirers’ (Article 18). In this, the Convention provides that the principle of ‘innocent 
acquisition’ can safeguard the validity of the securities transactions. Article 17(b) of the Geneva 
Convention guides its readers, willing to determinate when the ‘innocence’ exists, that they ‘must take 
into account the characteristics and requirements of securities markets, including the intermediated 
holding system’.160  
G.9.One such case occurs when someone (the acquirer) has accepted a credit of securities or the grant of 
an interest in securities or intermediated securities, which, however, (the securities or intermediated 
securities) are subject to the interest of another person. If the acquirer does not know, or ought to know, 
at the relevant time, that  
1. the securities it acquired are encumbered by someone else, and 
2. that its acquisition violates the rights of that other person which has an interest in the same 
securities, 
then it is considered an ‘innocent acquirer’, bearing no liability against that other person (Article 
18(1)(b). Furthermore, its rights or interests are not affected by the interest of that other person (Article 
18(1)(a)) and there is no risk of declaring the acquisition void on the aforementioned grounds (Article 
18(1)(c)). In other words, an acquirer is protected against any competing claim if it proves that it was 
unaware or had no obligation to be aware of that competing claim.
161
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Since this provision reflects a general principle, theoretically, it could be applied to a securities collateral 
transaction, if the latter takes place after the initiation of the insolvency proceedings. 
G.10.After the commencement of the winding-up, the creditors of the insolvent party have rights against 
the insolvent state, which may include also intermediated securities. Therefore, these securities are 
encumbered with the rights and interests of the insolvency creditors. If the insolvent person enters a 
financial collateral transaction with a third party, right after the declaration of insolvency, it will grant an 
interest in or will dispose of securities, which are encumbered with the rights of the insolvency creditors, 
to that third party, which will acquire an interest or the ownership in these already encumbered 
securities. If that third party is unaware of the already existent interests due to the insolvency of the 
collateral provider, it may be considered as ‘innocent acquirer’ and may save its collateral transaction 
from invalidation, by using the provision of Article 18(1) of the Geneva Convention. 
G.11.However, there is no explicit rule inside the Geneva Convention which links directly the principle 
of ‘innocent acquisition’ of Article 18 with the protection of collateral transactions in relation to 
insolvency of Articles 36 and 37. On the contrary, Articles 36 and 37, as they are interpreted, do protect 
collateral transactions from invalidation but with final deadline the moment of the insolvency 
commencement, but they do not allow their protection after that moment.
162
 Furthermore, Preamble (9) 
of the Geneva Convention includes a policy statement, according to which ‘this Convention is not 
intended to harmonize or otherwise affect insolvency law except to the extent necessary to provide for 
the effectiveness of rights and interests governed by this Convention’. 
G.12.What can be deducted from the aforementioned provisions of the Geneva Convention, as well as 
from its ‘minimalist’ approach -according to which the minimum protection is ensured by the Geneva 
Convention but higher protection is welcome (Article 31(2))-, is that the Geneva Convention leaves the 
determination of the rights of the collateral taker after the declaration of insolvency to the competence of 
the Contracting States, but it also pursues to provide the legal ground of ‘innocent acquisition’ (Article 
18) to those Contracting States which will choose to protect the collateral taker after the commencement 
of the collateral provider’s insolvency. In other words it aims at facilitating the legal regimes, which are 
willing to provide more protection to the collateral taker. 
COMPARISON OF THE COLLATERAL DIRECTIVE AND GENEVA CONVENTION 
G.13.From a systemic point of view, the Collateral Directive places the rule for the protection of 
collateral transactions after the beginning of winding-up proceedings under the article for the 
disapplication of insolvency provisions, while the Geneva Convention contains no explicit provision for 
this specific issue. 
G.14.As to the substantive law, whereas both legal instruments protect collateral transactions from being 
declared as void prior to the moment of insolvency commencement, they do not coincide in the 
provisions for the regulation of collateral transactions after the moment when the insolvency begins. The 
Collateral Directive rules, under Article 8(2), in a very clear manner, that financial collateral 
arrangements and relevant financial obligations can come into existence, as well as financial collateral 
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can be provided (and other relevant transactions, if the wider interpretation is adopted) after the 
initiation of the collateral provider’s winding-up procedure, being legally enforceable and binding on 
third parties, if the collateral taker is in ‘good faith’. However, the Geneva Convention does not protect 
in an explicit way neither of the kinds of collateral transactions -collateral arrangements, original 
collateral or top-up provisions, substitutions- and is interpreted as not protecting them after the 
commencement of insolvency and as leaving the regulation of this issue to the discretion of the 
Contracting States.
163
 It could be supported though that the Geneva Convention facilitates the 
introduction of domestic legislation favorable to the validity of collateral transactions conducted after 
insolvency, with the inclusion of a general clause of ‘good faith’ (Article 18). 
G.15.As to the principle of ‘good faith’, this is incorporated in the text of both the Collateral Directive 
and the Geneva Convention, but with different terms. The Collateral Directive refers to this principle, 
through the phrase ‘was not aware, nor should have been aware’. However, it does not refer to any legal 
instrument for its meaning, nor does it contain any definition of for its notion. On the other hand, the 
Geneva Convention not only has a special article for the ‘innocent acquisition’ (Article 18), where a 
similar phrase with the Collateral Directive is used, ‘actually knows or ought to know’, but also includes 
another article to provide guidance as to the determination of the notion of this phrase (Article 17(b)). 
Apart from this difference, the Collateral Directive limits the use of ‘good faith’ only in relation to 
insolvency, in contrast to the Geneva Convention, in which the article for ‘Acquisition by an innocent 
person’ covers all kinds of possible acquisitions under the Geneva Convention, except the gratuitous 
ones (Article 18(3)). 
 
  
                                                          
163
 GSC Official Commentary, par.36-27. 
 
   
INTERNATIONAL HELLENIC UNIVERSITY 
 
  
38 III. CONCLUSION 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
CON-1.The previous Capital attempted to analyze the way in which the Collateral Directive and the 
Geneva Convention respond to the same issues. Incompatibility does not seem to exist, since the core in 
most topics is the same for both of these legal instruments, it is only the further provisions, which vary. 
CON-2.As to the personal scope, both instruments cover major market participants, such as banks, 
financial institutions, investment firms, and, also, include minor market participants, in the form of 
Small- and Medium-sized enterprises. Their difference is that the Geneva Convention has a wider 
personal scope, as it includes natural persons and collateral agreements, where both parties are minor 
participants, which are covered by the Collateral Directive. 
CON-3.Regarding the types of eligible collateral, the material scope is wider in the Collateral Directive, 
due to the fact that, apart from financial instruments, which are also covered by the Geneva Convention, 
cash and credit claims are also qualified as collaterals. 
CON-4.In relation to the secured by the collateral arrangement obligations, the material scope of the 
Geneva Convention is broader, since it contains no limitation on the kind of secured obligations, such as 
the requirement that they should give right to cash settlement and/or delivery of securities, which is the 
case in the Collateral Directive. 
CON-5.Concerning the provision to the collateral taker of the right to use the collateral, both 
instruments agree on this possibility and both impose on the collateral taker the obligation to post 
equivalent collateral. The Geneva Convention slightly differs from the Collateral Directive, as it allows 
a more flexible time-frame for the fulfillment of this obligation in relation to the Collateral Directive. 
CON-6.Both legal instruments also respond to the need of the collateral taker to mitigate its subsequent 
exposure in relation to the collateral provider by the right to ask for additional (‘top-up’) collateral. The 
Geneva Convention provision is more favorable to the collateral taker than the Collateral Directive, 
since the former allows the top-up collateral provision in more cases. Namely, in the Geneva 
Convention a change in the collateral provider’s creditworthiness and circumstances agreed by the 
parties can justify the addition of further collateral, apart from the change in the value of the original 
collateral, which is the only justification under the Collateral Directive. 
CON-7.Finally, in the insolvency field, there is no apparent similarity as to the way the collateral taker 
is protected. The Collateral Directive upholds the validity of a collateral arrangement, secured obligation 
or an original collateral provision, when it takes place on the day but after the collateral provider is 
declared insolvent, if the collateral taker was in ‘good faith’ as to the insolvency. The Geneva 
Convention does not provide this possibility. 
CON-8.The issues covered by the Collateral Directive and the Geneva Convention are of great 
importance to the function of the financial markets, since they represent serious concerns of the market 
participants concerning the conclusion and performance of collateral arrangements in the transnational 
field. The provisions of the aforementioned legal instruments have the potential to respond to those 
challenges by attempting to eliminate the legal risk, through the harmonization of domestic laws. The 
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value of these attempts becomes apparent in the current discussion on the drafting of a ‘Securities Law 
Directive’, which is said to build on the language and the concepts of the Collateral Directive and the 
Geneva Convention.
164
 
  
                                                          
164
Paech, at p.p.3-5 and 25-30, Clifford Chance, ‘The Securities Law Directive’, Briefing Note- November 2010, and See 
G2/OT-MET (2011), European Commission, ‘Legislation on Legal Certainty of Securities Holding and Dispositions’, 
Member States Working Group-9th Discussion Paper, 15/02/2011. 
   
INTERNATIONAL HELLENIC UNIVERSITY 
 
  
40 IV. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
IV. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
BOOKS 
In English: 
Borchardt, Klaus-Dieter, “The ABC of European Union Law”, Publications Office of the European 
Union, 2010. 
Chun, Changmin, “Cross-Border Transactions of Intermediated Securities- A Comparative Analysis in 
Substantive Law and Private International Law”, Springer, 2012. 
Goode, Roy, Kronke, Herbert and McKendrick, Ewan, “Transnational Commercial Law- Text, Cases 
and Materials”, Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Gullifer, Louise and Payne, Jennifer: “Intermediated Securities: Legal Problems and Practical Issues”, 
Hart Publishing, 2010, where are included: 
1. Gullifer, Louise, “Ownership of Securities-The Problems Caused by Intermediation”, 
2. Mooney, Charles W., Jr and Kanda, Hideki, “Core Issues under the UNIDROIT (Geneva) 
Convention on Intermediated Securities: Views from United States and Japan”, 
3. Zacaroli, Antony, “Taking Security over Intermediated Securities: Chapter V of the UNIDROIT 
(Geneva) Convention on Intermediated Securities”, 
4. Johansson, Erica, “Reuse of Financial Collateral Revisited”. 
Johansson, Erica, “Property Rights in Investment Securities and the Doctrine of Specificity”, Springer, 
2009. 
Kanda, Hideki, Mooney, Charles, Thevenoz, Luc, Beraud, Stefane, assisted by Keijser, Thomas, 
“Official Commentary on the Unidroit Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities”, 
Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Keijser, Thomas Rudolf Maria Pius, “Financial Collateral Arrangements- The European Collateral 
Directive Considered from a Property and Insolvency Law Perspective”, Kluwer, 2006. 
In Greek: 
Kotsiris, Lampros E., “Insolvency Law”, Sakkoulas Publications, Athens-Thessaloniki, 7th Edition, 
2008. 
ARTICLES 
In English: 
Clifford Chance, “The Securities Law Directive”, Briefing Note- November 2010. 
Keijser ,Thomas Rudolf Maria Pius, “A Need for a Change- The Undesirable Consequences of the 
Settlement Finality Directive and the Collateral Directive in the Field of Property and Insolvency Law, 
in Particular for Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises”, Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht, 2006. 
Loeber, Klaus M., “The German Implementation of the EC Directive on Financial Collateral 
Arrangements”, Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 2005. 
Loeber, Klaus M. and Klima, Ewa, “The Implementation of Directive 2002/47 on Financial Collateral 
Arrangements”, Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 2006. 
Paech, Philipp, “Market Needs as Paradigm: Breaking up the Thinking on EU Securities Law”, LSE 
Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 11/2012. 
Thevenoz, Luc, “Intermediated Securities, Legal Risk and the International Harmonization of 
Commercial Law”, Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance, Spring 2008. 
In German: 
Loeber, Klaus M., “Der Entwurf einer Richtlinie fuer Finanzsicherheiten”, BKR 2001. 
   
INTERNATIONAL HELLENIC UNIVERSITY 
 
  
41 IV. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Obermueller, Manfred and Hartenfels, Holger, “Finanzsicherheiten”, BKR 2004. 
In Greek: 
Pergamalis, Georgos, “Directive 2002/47/EC for Financial Collateral Arrangements”, Corporate and 
Business Journal, 10th Year, 1/2004. 
 
PhD THESIS 
In Italian:  
Bonfanti, Franco, “The Pledge under the Civil Code and Special Legislation: The Impact of the New 
Legislation for Contracts of Financial Collateral”, PhD Thesis, Ferrara University of Studies. 
 
LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENTS 
 
Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, p.p.47. 
Directive 2009/44/EC, OJ L 146, 10.6.2009, p.p.37. 
Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements of consumers, OJ L 133, 22.5.2008, p.p.66. 
Directive 2006/48/EC, relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions OJ L 
177, 30.6.2006, p.p.1. 
Directive 2002/47/EC on Financial Collateral Arrangements, OJ L 168, 27.6.2002, p.p. 43.  
European Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC, OJ L 124, 20.5.2003. 
UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities, CONF. 11/2, Doc. 42.  
 
RELEVANT DOCUMENTS 
 
G2/OT-MET (2011), European Commission, “Legislation on Legal Certainty of Securities Holding and 
Dispositions”, Member States Working Group-9th Discussion Paper, 15/02/2011. 
COM(2006) 833 final, Commission of the European Communities, “Report from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council- Evaluation Report on the Financial Collateral Arrangements 
Directive”. 
MEMO/01/108, “Proposed Directive on Financial Collateral Arrangements- Frequently Asked 
Questions”, 30 March 2001. 
UNIDROIT 2011, S78B/CEM/2/Doc.2, “References to Sources of Law Outside the Convention 
(prepared by the Secretariat)”, November 2011. 
UNIDROIT 2003, Study LXXVIII – Doc.7, Summary Report, “ Harmonised Substantive Rules 
regarding Securities Held with an Intermediary”. 
UNIDROIT Study LXXVIII. Doc.19. 
CASES 
 
C- 6-64, Costa V. Enel, [1964].  
INTERNET 
 
UNIDROIT website, under the title “About UNIDROIT”, “Overview”, “Legislative Policy”, in internet: 
<http://www.unidroit.org/dynasite.cfm?dsmid=103284>.  
